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Abstract:  What Moral Responsibility Requires 
 
The primary goal of this dissertation is to articulate and defend a robust commonsense 
libertarian theory of moral responsibility; that moral agents are the causes, and owners, of their 
actions, and in virtue of this it is appropriate to hold them praiseworthy or blameworthy for what 
they do. 
Here, I critique and defend two commonsense principles concerning moral responsibility 
– the control principle, and the principle of alternate possibilities.  In recent years these 
principles have come under attack from philosophers seeking to propose a theory of moral 
responsibility consistent with a deterministic worldview.  The existence of moral luck would 
mean that the control principle is false; I argue that moral luck is impossible.  Harry Frankfurt 
famously presents a supposed counter-example to the principle of alternate possibilities; I argue 
Frankfurt’s case turns on an equivocation between alternate possibilities and alternate outcomes. 
  I contend that moral responsibility requires an agent to have full control of her actions, to 
be the author of what she is praiseworthy or blameworthy for.  This view requires indeterminism 
of a special kind, agent-causation (or something very much like it), where something is an agent-
cause if and only if at a given time, it, and only it, determines its actions, and was not determined 
to act in this way by outside forces.  Only agent-causes can be truly responsible for their actions 
because only the actions of agent-causes can be traced back to them and no further.  And finally I 
argue we have good reason to believe we are such agent-causes. 
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William Simkulet 
Dissertation: What Moral Responsibility Requires 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1 Prospectus 
 The primary goal of this work is to defend a robust, commonsense notion of moral 
responsibility from critics whose work has been taken to weaken our confidence in our moral 
beliefs on the matter.  I contend that the commonsense moral beliefs that most of us come to the 
table with, so to speak, are maximally consistent with a libertarian theory of moral 
responsibility, that moral agents are morally responsible for their actions because they are the 
causes, and thus owners, of those actions. 
 In this dissertation, I discuss three kinds of arguments that, if successful, would each give 
us good reason to revise a substantial portion of our commonsense beliefs, including the vast 
majority of our moral beliefs, and reject the vast majority of our moral intuitions.  In each case, I 
argue that these criticisms fail to shake these beliefs, beliefs which are best understood as the 
foundation for a libertarian theory of moral responsibility and moral agency. 
I begin in chapter 2 with a defense of the control principle, according to which moral 
responsibility requires control over one’s actions; control of the kind necessary for libertarian 
ownership.  According to the problem of moral luck, all of our actions are a matter of luck, and 
thus none of us has the control required for moral responsibility.  I argue that moral luck is 
impossible, and that although moral agents lack control over many aspects of their life, they have 
control over what matters – their free choices. 
Chapter 3 is a defense of the principle of alternate possibilities, which states that moral 
agents can only be held morally responsible if they could have done otherwise.  Harry Frankfurt, 
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in his now famous article “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, argues that the 
principle of alternate possibilities is false, and constructs a case that purports to show an agent 
who is undeniably morally responsible, despite lacking alternate possibilities.1  Frankfurt’s 
infamous case fails in its task, and I argue that more recent Frankfurt-style cases also fail.   
In chapter 4, I argue that indeterminism is logically possible, and that we have good 
reason to believe that it is true of the actual world.  Determinism is the theory that the actual state 
of affairs, coupled with the actual laws of nature, determine a unique future, and that there are no 
other possible futures given the actual state of affairs and the actual laws of nature.  In contrast, 
indeterminism is the theory that at any given time, the actual state of affairs and the actual laws 
of nature may cause one of several possible futures to become actual.  If the control principle and 
the principle of alternate possibilities are true, moral responsibility requires an indeterministic 
world.  To the extent that we believe moral agents exist, and that some people are actually 
morally responsible for their actions, we are committed to the view that indeterminism is true of 
the actual world. 
In the final chapter of this dissertation, I propose several avenues of investigation for both 
the critic and the supporter of libertarianism.  For the critic, I offer new approaches that, if 
successful, would give us reason to reject our foundational moral beliefs with which 
libertarianism is so consistent.  Although I am doubtful these approaches will lead to success, I 
believe they are the most likely approaches to lead to success.  In contrast, for the libertarian I 
sketch the framework for a robust theory of moral responsibility, and a method for calculating 
how praiseworthy or blameworthy moral agents are in virtue of what they have complete control 
over, their free choices.  
                                                 
1 Frankfurt, Harry G., 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, 
No. 23: 829-839. 
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1.2 Method 
The primary goal of this work is a meta-ethical inquiry into the concept of moral 
responsibility, with a special focus on what conditions are necessary for an agent to be morally 
responsible.  The main body of this dissertation is concerned with sketching a consistent 
interpretation of this concept and its application.  A secondary goal for this work is to show that 
we have good reason to believe that moral responsibility is possible at the actual world. 
 Because this primary goal of this dissertation is an inquiry into the actual concept of 
moral responsibility people have, I approach the subject in a manner similar to Donald 
Davidson’s radical interpretation, taking the stance that the best way to interpret our beliefs and 
ideas about moral responsibility is to assume (a) that our beliefs are coherent and generally 
internally consistent with one another, and (b) that they correspond to the actual world in some 
non-arbitrary, non-coincidental way.  The best interpretation of our concept of moral 
responsibility, then, is like the best interpretation of any other concept or belief – the one that 
makes us out to be right about most things (by weight, not number2). 
 It is, of course, possible that there is no coherent concept of moral responsibility, that 
different people have different concepts of moral responsibility, or that concept of moral 
responsibility that the majority of people have in mind is impossible at the actual world such that 
all of our ascriptions of moral praise and blame are false. 
Despite this fact, to avoid crumbling into an abyss of radical skepticism, we must assume 
that people are right about most things that matter.  While we can tell an evolutionary story to 
                                                 
2 In order to avoid radical skepticism, and to engage in philosophical debate at all, we must make certain 
assumptions about the world, most notably that we are right about most things.  However, this assumption that any 
given belief is more likely to be true than false, or that were we to count all of our beliefs then the majority of them 
would be true.  Rather, it is to assume that the beliefs that we are most confident in, and the beliefs that we regularly 
use to help us in everyday life are most likely correct.  We can, of course, consider whether or not certain portions of 
these beliefs are correct, but to seriously entertain the notion that a significant majority of these beliefs are false is to 
neuter one’s ability to act as a rational agent. 
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this effect (roughly, people with numerous false beliefs about the matters that concern 
themselves on a regular basis are less likely to survive than those with largely true beliefs about 
those matters), to even begin to properly interpret others we must assume their beliefs are 
coherent and correspond to the actual world.  Moral philosophy is, by definition, concerned with 
what we ought do, and to the extent that our moral beliefs guide our every action, we have good 
reason to believe they are both consistent and represent facts about the world.  Thus, our moral 
beliefs are at least comparable to, if not more basic than, our beliefs about the physical world. 
In virtue of this, I believe we have good reason to think that if something must be true of 
the physical world for the bulk of our moral beliefs to be true, then that thing is true of the 
physical world.  In a sense, our moral beliefs can be taken as ad hoc indicators of physical truths 
about the world insofar as our moral beliefs are assumed true, and can be, such as in the case of 
our beliefs about moral responsibility, dependent upon certain truths about the physical world. 
1.3 Terminology 
 In this section, I will define some of the important terms that will be used in this 
dissertation.  Defined words are italicized.  Ethics is the branch of philosophy concerned with 
answering the question “What ought I do?”.  The act of asking the question implies two things.  
First, that “ought” (at least sometimes) implies “can”; the act of asking the question is pointless 
unless one can do as one ought.  Second, the question also implies that one can do otherwise, that 
one can fail to act as they should.  If moral success was guaranteed, and one couldn’t help but do 
what one should, then the question is pointless.  These implications suggest that if moral facts 
exist, then we know certain facts about the world – we know that persons can, at least some 
times, do the things that they should, and they can also, at least some times), fail to do what they 
should. 
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 To be morally responsible for something is to stand in some relationship to that thing, 
such that one is the appropriate object of moral praise or blame in virtue of that relationship.  If 
the thing is morally good, the agent is praiseworthy, if it is morally bad, the agent is 
blameworthy.   Galen Strawson calls this “true moral responsibility” 3, and contends that for one 
to be truly morally responsible for something is for it to “makes sense” for one to be rewarded in 
heaven or punished in hell for that something.4  Only moral agents can be morally responsible; 
only moral agents can be morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. 
 To be morally praiseworthy for something is to be the appropriate object of praise in 
virtue of one’s moral responsibility for that thing, all things being equal.  To be morally 
blameworthy for something is to be the appropriate object of blame in virtue of one’s moral 
responsibility for that thing, all things being equal.5   
Moral responsibility can be contrasted with various kinds of non-moral responsibility.  
For example, moral and non-moral agents alike can be causally responsible for something, 
where to be causally responsible is to play a causal role in bringing about that something.  To be 
legally responsible for something is to be such that a government can reward or punish you for 
that something under their laws.   
Being morally responsible is also different from taking responsibility for something.  The 
term “taking responsibility” has two conventional and somewhat misleading usages – in one 
sense, to take responsibility for something is to acknowledge one’s actual moral responsibility 
for that thing and to take steps to accept blame or praise in virtue of it.  For example, one might 
                                                 
3 See Strawson, Galen 1994. 
4 As Strawson puts it “The stress on the words ‘makes sense’ is important, for one certainly does not have to believe 
in any version of the story of heaven and hell in order to understand the notion of true moral responsibility that it is 
being used to illustrate.” 
5 To be praiseworthy or blameworthy is not to be such that it is appropriate under all circumstances to be praised or 
blamed.  There are circumstances when one ought not openly act to blame or punish the blameworthy, or praise or 
reward the praiseworthy.  It is to be the appropriate object of praise or blame respectively, all things being equal. 
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admit to accidentally breaking something due to one’s carelessness and offer to pay for it.  The 
second sense in which one can take responsibility for something is to treat one’s self as if one is 
morally responsible for that thing regardless of one’s actual moral responsibility.  For example, 
one might take responsibility for a dead relative’s children and raise them despite no clear moral 
obligation to do so.  One can also take responsibility in this way for something that it is wholly 
inappropriate to treat one as morally responsible for.  For example, one might take responsibility 
for something she didn’t do for some utilitarian gain, or to protect someone else.6 
 Just as things can be responsible in ways other than morally, things can be praiseworthy 
or blameworthy in non-moral ways as well.  For example, a car might be praiseworthy to the 
extent that it is instrumentally valuable in achieving some goal, and blameworthy insofar as it 
fails to contribute to some other goal.  It might be appropriate to praise a single car insofar as it 
requires little regular maintenance, is relatively safe for passengers, and/or is suitable for off-
road driving, while at the same time it may be appropriate to blame the car for being fuel 
inefficient, for high carbon emissions, and/or for being difficult to get parts for.  The difference 
between being morally praiseworthy or blameworthy and being praiseworthy or blameworthy in 
                                                 
6 In the article 1998 “Morally Responsible People without Freedom,” John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza 
contend that agents become morally responsible by taking responsibility.  For Fischer and Ravizza, agents are 
morally responsible for their behavior if and only if they own the mechanisms that cause their behavior, and they 
come to own these mechanisms by taking responsibility for them, where taking responsibility for a mechanism 
doesn’t require knowledge or acceptance of the mechanism itself, but only embracing responsibility for the kinds of 
behavior the mechanism causes.  Taking responsibility in this way doesn’t require a direct or consistent admission of 
guilt for this behavior, rather it only requires that the agent accepts herself as an appropriate object of certain kinds 
of reactive attitudes because of the behavior of the mechanism. 
Fischer and Ravizza’s account of how one comes to be morally responsible is at odds with our commonsense beliefs  
– first, it seems to postulate an erroneous means of coming to own something – for Fischer and Ravizza, one owns 
something simply by treating oneself as if one owned it.  It is, at the very least, fraud, if not downright theft.  Their 
account of property acquisition is easily contrasted with John Locke’s account of ownership.  For Locke, one owns 
one’s labor because one is the creator, cause, or author, of one’s labor, while for Fischer and Ravizza one comes to 
take responsibility either because (a) one finds it practical to be treated as the owner of one’s actions, or (b) one has 
been subject to (apparently erroneous) “moral education” that has taught one that one is the author, and owner, of 
one’s actions.  Fischer and Ravizza’s approach is, in part, motivated by their belief that moral responsibility is 
compatible with determinism, and traditional accounts of ownership, such as the kind Locke discusses, are 
incompatible with determinism.  Unfortunately, their account of  “moral responsibility” is substantially at odds with 
commonsense notions of ownership and moral responsibility. 
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light of these other standards is that the standard moral agents are judged morally praiseworthy 
or blameworthy for is an intrinsically valuable one, while these other standards are merely 
instrumentally valuable, depending upon one’s goals and the circumstances one finds oneself in.  
This is to say that it is always good to be morally praiseworthy, and always bad to be morally 
blameworthy, but it is not always important for a car to be able to drive off-road, and not always 
bad for it to be fuel inefficient (say, if there is a fuel surplus, etc.). 
 Libertarianism is the theory that moral agents are the authors, or sole causes, of their 
actions, and in virtue of this fact, own their actions, and can be morally responsible for them.  
According to this view, the morally relevant relationship moral responsibility is concerned with 
is a direct-ownership relationship – moral agents own their actions because they are the causes of 
their actions.  Libertarianism is an incompatibilist theory because it holds that what an agent does 
is up to her, and not causally determined by antecedent circumstances alone.  Incompatibilism is 
the theory that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism, the theory that the actual 
past, coupled with the actual laws of nature, necessitates one possible future.  According to the 
libertarian, moral responsibility requires indeterminism to be true at the actual world, where 
indeterminism is the theory that their actual state of affairs, coupled with the actual laws of 
nature, could produce one of multiple possible futures. 
 Compatibilism is the theory that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism.  
Compatibilists maintain that moral responsibility is possible if determinism is  true.  Hard 
compatibilism is the theory that moral responsibility requires determinism.  Hard 
incompatibilism (sometimes referred to as hard determinism) is the theory that moral 
responsibility requires indeterminism, that determinism is true, and thus no one is actually 
morally responsible for anything. 
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1.4 Next 
 I contend that libertarianism is maximally consistent with our commonsense moral 
beliefs and intuitions.  In the next two chapters, I look at philosophical arguments meant to show 
that our beliefs are at odds with libertarianism.  In chapter 2, I argue that although we admit 
human beings lack complete control over ever aspect of their lives, we believe they have 
complete control over their actions, and that in virtue of this it makes sense to say that they are 
morally responsible for those actions.  In chapter 3, I defend the position that our moral beliefs 
and intuitions indicate that moral responsibility requires alternate possibilities; that is to say that 
moral responsibility is only possible in a world where indeterminism is true.  In contrast, in 
chapter 4 I argue that the indeterminism our moral intuitions requires is not incoherent, that it is 
theoretically possible, and in virtue of the assumption necessary to interpret our concept of moral 
responsibility, we have good reason to think that the indeterminism required for moral 
responsibility occurs regularly in the actual world. 
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Chapter 2:  The Control Principle 
2.1 Introduction 
 To be morally responsible for something is to stand in a relationship to that thing such 
that, in virtue of that relationship, one can be either praiseworthy or blameworthy depending on 
whether that thing is good or bad.  According to our commonsense moral beliefs it doesn’t make 
sense to hold someone blameworthy or praiseworthy for something unless that thing was up to 
that person, and not merely a matter of luck or chance.  In other words, it wouldn’t make sense 
to blame someone for something that they had no control over. 
For example, given what we believe about time, it is impossible for someone to be either 
blameworthy or praiseworthy for something that happened before they were born.  Similarly, it is 
impossible for someone to be morally responsible for their own birth.  Furthermore, intuitively, 
if some event prior to a person’s being born causally determined them to act in a certain manner, 
that person is not morally responsible for what they are caused to do in this way. 
This idea can be captured by the following principle: 
Control Principle:  Moral responsibility requires control.  For one to be morally 
responsible for some thing, one must be in control of that thing.  (CP from now on.) 
According to libertarianism, moral responsibility requires a kind of ownership; moral 
agents are morally responsible for their actions because they own their actions, and they own 
their actions because they are the unique creators of their actions; when a moral agent acts, her 
actions are up to her and her alone.  John Locke famously argued that one can come to own 
things in the world by mixing out labor with them.  However, for Locke, this ownership is 
derived from your prior ownership of your labor, which you own because you are the creator of 
your own labor.  
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Sometimes it makes sense to say that moral agents are morally responsible for the 
consequences of their actions, but this is derivative of, and contingent on, said their ownership of 
their actions, much as how, for Locke, one’s ownership of a concrete physical object, such as an 
apple you pick with your labor, is derived from the mixing of one’s labor with said objects. 
Libertarianism is maximally consistent with the control principle.  Until recently, most 
moral philosophers accepted that some form of the control principle was true.  However, the 
problem of moral luck threatens to undermine the plausibility of the control principle, and with it 
the plausibility of libertarianism.  The problem can be summed up as follows: (1) according to 
the control principle, moral responsibility requires control and thus cannot be a matter of luck, 
(2) everything is a matter of luck, thus (3) moral responsibility is impossible.  The problem arises 
because (1) and (2) are prima facie true, but the conclusion, (3), is prima facie false. 
In this chapter I argue that the kind of control required for moral responsibility is not 
inconsistent with the way in which everything can be said to be a matter of luck.  Although it 
may be a matter of luck that any given set of affairs exist at a given time, given this set of affairs, 
a moral agent may still have control over a subset of following sets of affairs. 
2.2 Aristotle and the Control Principle 
 Aristotle is often credited with presenting the first theory of moral responsibility.7  For 
Aristotle, to be morally responsible for something is to be the appropriate object of praise or 
blame if that something warrants it.  Early in book 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle claims 
only an agent whose action is voluntary is an appropriate object of praise and blame.8  For 
                                                 
7 Randall Curren and Jean Roberts have challenged the view that the praiseworthiness and blameworthiness 
discussed in the Nicomachean Ethics is anything like our contemporary account of moral responsibility.  If true, then 
Aristotle’s account may be at odds with our contemporary normative beliefs and intuitions.  However, Susan Meyer 
offers a stalwart defense of the traditional view in the early chapters of her Aristotle on Moral Responsibility, so we 
have good reason to think our contemporary interpretation mirrors Aristotle’s own view. 
8 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109b30-1110a4 
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something to be voluntary, he says, it must satisfy two conditions – a control condition and an 
awareness condition.9 
Aristotle’s control condition is first and foremost an origin condition – for an agent’s 
action to be voluntary, it must originate in the agent – it cannot be compelled by factors outside 
of her control.  If something external to the agent completely causally determines her action, for 
Aristotle, it doesn’t come from the agent herself, and thus she isn’t morally responsible for what 
she is caused to do.  Strictly speaking, her actions are not her own in such a case.  Similarly, if 
one’s actions were completely causally determined by the sort of thing she is, they would be 
equally outside of her control and merely a byproduct of external forces – whatever it is that 
made her what she is.  Furthermore, if one’s actions are caused by chance or luck, and not the 
agent herself, they are equally outside of her control.  To satisfy the control condition, one’s 
actions need to be up to the agent alone, such that she is neither causally determined to do them, 
nor that it is merely blind, arbitrary luck that she acts in the way she does. 
To satisfy the control condition, one’s actions cannot be completely causally determined 
by the past, nor can they be the result of luck over which one has no control, such as quantum 
indeterminacy.  Many philosophers worry that these conditions are mutually exclusive, but 
despite this it is at least prima facie intuitively plausible, for example, that agents can act for 
reasons without being causally determined to act for those reasons.  Similarly, it is prima facie 
intuitively plausible that agents can choose to act for no reason at all, and so long as the choice 
itself wasn’t the result of luck, said agents can be, and often are, blameworthy for such actions. 
To satisfy the control condition is to have control over whether you act, however this 
alone is insufficient for moral responsibility as without some substantive rationale for choosing 
one action over another, acting would be arbitrary.  Imagine an agent who is put in a position 
                                                 
9 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1110a-1111b4 
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where she has the option of acting or not acting, but she lacks any beliefs about what it would be 
to act or not act, and what either would produce in the actual world.  Such an agent has no 
substantive rationale for choosing to act or not act, and thus her choice is inherently arbitrary.  At 
first glance, we might say that such an agent is morally responsible for the consequences of what 
she chose to do, but this intuition is based on the fact that we generally assume that people know 
what they are doing.  By assumption, to that agent, acting and not acting are both unknowns and 
she is forced to do one of them.  The problem with holding such an agent morally responsible for 
what she does is that in an important way she lacks control over what it is she causes because she 
is ignorant of what acting or not acting actually is.  Not only does she lack any beliefs that 
suggest that acting would cause a better or worse scenario than not acting, but from her position 
acting and not acting are indistinguishable.  To hold her morally responsible for her choice to act 
or not act in such a case would be to hold her responsible for something that is inherently 
arbitrary, as she has no way to differentiate between her two options, but must do one of them. 
The idea that moral responsibility cannot be determined arbitrarily is, in many ways, even 
more foundational than the control principle, and can be captured by the following principle: 
The non-arbitrary principle:  Moral responsibility is not determined arbitrarily.  Whether 
one is morally responsible for something is not a matter of chance.  (NP from now on.) 
Aristotle’s second condition – the awareness condition – helps bridge the gap between 
the control condition and NP.  To satisfy the awareness condition, the agent must be nontrivially 
aware of what she does in order to be morally responsible for it.  But as with the control 
condition, merely satisfying the awareness condition is not sufficient for moral responsibility.  If 
we are but puppets of external forces and luck, the puppet who is aware of what the puppeteer 
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makes her do is no less a slave, no less in control, and it doesn’t make sense to attribute her 
actions to her rather than the puppeteer.   
If an agent satisfies both the control condition and the awareness condition, she is in 
control of both whether she acts and how she acts.  If an agent has this kind of control over what 
she does, then she can not only choose to act or not act, but she can choose to do so on the basis 
of what she knows she would be doing or avoiding.10  This is to say that she can act for reasons, 
and thus non-arbitrarily.  It is this kind of control that is prima facie necessary for moral 
responsibility for Aristotle, and this just is the kind of control the control principle requires for 
moral responsibility. 
2.3 Moral Luck 
 The control principle’s prima facie intuitive plausibility comes, in large part, from its 
assertion that our moral responsibility, and what we deserve, morally speaking, is not arbitrary or 
random; rather it’s completely up to us whether or not we are blameworthy or praiseworthy 
(independent of whether others actually blame or praise us). 
Despite this, it seems as if we are perfectly content to say that people are morally 
responsible for things that are outside of their control – a matter of luck.  For example, it is 
generally accepted that moral agents are morally responsible for the consequences of their 
actions, despite the fact that the actual consequences of one’s actions are beyond one’s control.   
Moral luck would occur if someone is morally responsible for something that is outside 
of their control.  The control principle precludes the possibility of moral luck; thus if moral luck 
is possible, CP is false.  The problem of moral luck is that we seem to hold two contradictory 
                                                 
10 On this model it is possible for an agent to act on the basis of what she knows.  However, it seems equally 
possible that an agent can choose to act (a)  in absence of knowledge about what she is doing, or (b) in spite of what 
she knows.  In these cases, what makes such an agent morally responsible is that although she may not know, or 
care, what she is doing, she is aware that she doesn’t know, or care what she is doing.  Her actions are still 
voluntary. 
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positions – first, that moral responsibility requires control, and second that moral agents are 
occasionally morally responsible for things that are outside of their control, such as their 
character traits, the results of their actions, etc.   
For the rest of this chapter, I look at the problem of moral luck.  I begin by looking at the 
problem of moral luck, and distinguishing between moral luck and what I call record luck, or 
luck in regards to one’s moral record.  I argue record luck is not a kind of moral luck, and thus 
the existence of record luck doesn’t show that the control principle is false.  Next I discuss the 
four kinds of moral luck that some have said exist – resultant luck, circumstantial luck, 
constitutive luck, and causal luck – and argue that the luck involved in the types of cases moral 
luck advocates discuss does not contribute to our actual blameworthiness or praiseworthiness, 
although it may contribute to our apparent blameworthiness or praiseworthiness.  This is to say 
that it may be a matter of luck whether or not one is praised for doing good, or blamed for doing 
bad, but that it is not a matter of luck whether one is praiseworthy or blameworthy. 
2.3.1 The Problem of Moral Luck 
 The problem of moral luck is that we tend to be committed to two contradictory 
propositions – (1) the control principle is true – moral agents are only morally responsible for 
what is in their control, and (2) people can be morally responsible for things that are, strictly 
speaking, outside of their control, such as their character, the results of their actions, or their 
being put into “no win” situations where, up to that point, they have done nothing wrong, but 
after that point, whatever choice they make, they will be morally blameworthy for something. 
In Luck and Moral Responsibility, Michael Zimmerman frames the problem of moral 
luck as arising from the following argument against the possibility of morality: 
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1. A person P is morally responsible for an event e’s occurring only if e’s occurring was 
not a matter of luck. 
2. No event is such that its occurring is not a matter of luck. 
Therefore 
3. No event is such that P is morally responsible for its occurring. (1987, 374) 
The problem, Zimmerman explains, is that the argument seems valid, and both premises seem 
true, but the conclusion is prima facie false.  The first premise follows from the control principle, 
while the second follows largely from our at best limited control over the world, control that 
itself is a matter of luck insofar as it rests upon the contingency of our birth.  In light of the 
validity of the argument, philosophers have three possibilities – (1) they can accept the 
conclusion, that no one is morally responsible for anything11, (2) they can accept the possibility 
of moral luck and accept the falsity of the control principle12, or (3) they can reject the possibility 
of moral luck and show that there is at least one situation where an agent’s moral responsibility 
is in no way a byproduct of luck.  I take approach (3) below. 
2.3.1.1 Terminology 
Before we begin, I wish to settle on some terminology to frame the upcoming discussion.  
Let’s begin with moral responsibility.  For Aristotle, to be morally responsible is to be the 
appropriate object of praise or blame for that thing, if that thing warrants it.  Derk Pereboom 
adds to this concept of moral responsibility by pointing out that it makes sense to say that an 
agent is morally responsible even when she is not praiseworthy or blameworthy, such as “when 
                                                 
11 Zimmerman contends that Joel Feinberg does this in his 1970 article Doing and Deserving, pg. 34-37.   
12 Robert Merrihew Adams (1985), Judith Andre (1983), Margaret Urban Walker (1991), and Bernard Williams 
(1981, 1993) are notable for taking such a position.  Brynmor Browne (1992) is open to the possibility of moral 
luck, but contends that if it does exist, we ought to at least partially revise our moral practices. 
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she performs an action that is morally indifferent.”13  Pereboom asserts that there are some 
situations where an agent can be the author of an action where said action is neither good nor 
bad, and thus the agent would neither be praiseworthy or blameworthy for it.  What makes an 
agent morally responsible is that there is a morally relevant relationship between her and what 
she is morally responsible for.  For the libertarian incompatibilist, as for Aristotle, this 
relationship is an ownership relationship – a moral agent owns her actions because she, and she 
alone, brings them about. 
When I say that an agent is morally responsible for something, I mean that agent’s moral 
record, or moral history, is affected by that thing.  One’s moral record is a list of that agent’s 
moral responsibility, praiseworthiness, and blameworthiness.  To be praiseworthy is to have your 
moral record affected in some objective, intrinsically positive way; to be blameworthy is to have 
your record affected in some intrinsically negative way.  By “moral record,” I mean to pick out 
roughly what Michael Zimmerman calls a “moral ledger” (2002, 555, my emphasis).  For our 
purposes, these terms are interchangeable, however I prefer the term “moral record” because I 
believe Zimmerman’s term, “moral ledger,” is inadvertently misleading.  I believe it evokes a 
particular method for determining what I call one’s total moral worth, by which I mean 
something like an ultimate moral assessment of a person, akin to the sort of moral assessment 
many religions believe awaits us after death.  I believe the term “moral ledger” inadvertently 
implies that to calculate one’s total moral worth, one might simply add up the entries in one’s 
moral record and arrive at some figure that represents one’s total moral worth.14 If such is the 
case, luck seems to play a role in determining one’s total moral worth.  The following case 
illustrates this: 
                                                 
13 See Pereboom, 2005, page 18. 
14 Note that Zimmerman never uses the term “moral ledger” in this way. 
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Chris and Kris are virtuous moral agents15 whose lives are identical in every morally 
relevant way up until time t, at which point, by chance, Kris dies and Chris continues to live a 
virtuous life. 
If one’s total moral worth is calculated solely by tabulating the entries in one’s moral 
record, Chris’s total moral worth, given her greater number of virtuous acts, would be higher 
than Kris’s, and is so because of the contingent fact that Kris dies before Chris.  This account is 
prima facie inconsistent with our commonsense moral intuitions, and I reject such an account.   
There are various quick fixes to this problem (One could divide moral responsibility over the 
chances to do good, or given a deterministic world we should calculate the total of Chris’s actual 
and potential lives, and Kris’s actual and potential lives16, etc.), but each has their own problems 
and there are no obvious solutions.  I wish to remain agnostic about the concept of total moral 
worth, as it is outside the scope of this dissertation.  In chapter 5, though, I will return to this 
topic briefly, and argue that whatever concept of total moral worth one may mistake for a 
problem of moral luck ought to be revised. 
Moral luck exists if and only if one is morally responsible for something that is a matter 
of luck, and outside of their control.  In other words, moral luck exists if and only if luck plays a 
role in the contents of an entry in one’s moral record, not if luck plays a role in the number of 
entries in one’s moral record.  Let us call luck in regards to number of entries in our moral record 
“record luck” to distinguish it from moral luck.  Although it is uncontroversially true that the 
total number of entries in our moral record are a matter of luck, it is not at all clear that the 
number of entries in one’s moral record contributes to how blameworthy or praiseworthy one is 
for what they’ve done.  For more on this, see 2.3.2.2.1 below. 
                                                 
15 By “virtuous moral agents” I mean morally praiseworthy agents whose actions are entirely praiseworthy. 
16 This is similar to Zimmerman’s concept of responsibility tout court that I discuss in below. 
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In the moral luck debate, philosophers tend to use the terms “luck” and “chance” 
interchangeably.  I think this is a mistake, and make the following distinction:  Something is a 
matter of chance if and only if no agent has control over that thing, while something is a matter 
of luck if and only if the agent in question has no control over that thing.  For example, say a 
coworker gets you a present for your birthday.  What you get it outside of your control – a matter 
of luck for you; but surely it’s not a matter of chance because it was within your coworker’s 
control.  For your coworker it is neither a matter of luck or chance.  Note that this isn’t to say 
that you don’t exert some influence over what your coworker gets you – you can drop hints, 
make it impossible for her to get certain items, etc.  But, ultimately, what she gets you isn’t up to 
you, and thus it is outside of your control in the morally relevant sense. 
 The final terminological distinction I make here is between kinds of control.  Even 
philosophers who believe the control principle is true have different beliefs about what kind of 
control it requires for moral responsibility.  I believe it is important to distinguish between three 
senses of the term that have been the focus of philosophical inquiry – partial control, complete 
control simpliciter, and qualified complete control.  You can be said to have partial control over 
something if you played some role in that thing’s coming about, or not coming about, or in how 
that thing occurs or doesn’t occur.  In the case above, you may have partial control over what 
your coworker gets you insofar as she might be influenced in one way or another by what you 
say, or what do you, or insofar as you limit her choices (such as by going crazy and buying up all 
of the flowers in the tri-state area to make sure that she cannot buy you flowers).   
At best, human beings only have partial control over the consequences of their actions – 
for example, we might choose to jump into the lake with the goal of saving the drowning child, 
but whether you can succeed in saving the child (or even in jumping into the lake) is in a 
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nontrivial sense outside of your control.  You contribute to the event by choosing to act (if you 
don’t actually choose to jump into the lake, then you don’t jump.  Perhaps a muscle spasm causes 
your body to perform the same actions as if you had chosen to jump, but in a nontrivial sense you 
are not doing the jumping because you didn’t choose to do so.), but any number of contingent 
facts outside of your control may interfere with your success. 
 In contrast to partial control, there are two senses in which one can be said to have be in 
complete control.  To have complete control simpliciter, what Zimmerman calls “unrestricted 
control” 17 over something is for that something to be up you, and you alone, whether or not that 
thing occurs, such that there is nothing that it outside of your control that could possibly 
interfere, or have interfered, with that thing.  This is the sort of control that an all powerful, all 
knowing god is said to have over everything (or at least over every non-agent).  None of us have 
complete control simpliciter over anything, as to have complete control simpliciter over 
something requires that every fact about whether or not that thing occurs be in your control – 
from the laws of nature to whether or not you were born to bring it about.  We exercise no 
control whatsoever over the past, including our own birth18, let alone the laws of nature, and thus 
cannot have complete control simpliciter over anything.  Because human beings lack moral 
responsibility for their own original existence, and one needs to exist to be morally responsible 
for anything, it is a matter of luck that we are morally responsible for anything – that is to say 
                                                 
17 See Zimmerman 1987.  
18 If time travel is possible, then it may be possible to exert some kind of control over the past, but this control is 
atypical at best.  For example, the main character in Robert A. Heinlein’s short story  ‘“ –All You Zombies–”’, 
through various acts of time travel, turns out to be his own mother and father.  The story leaves it an open question 
whether this he/she, through still more time travel and perhaps other science fiction, might turn out to be every 
person who ever existed in his fictional world, and perhaps even to be the cause of everything in his world, 
including the world itself.  This character would exert a unique kind of control over his own birth, but it is not 
complete control simpliciter, as he/she lacks control over his/her birth at the time of his/her birth.  This control 
might be called retroactive control, but retroactive control implies the possibility that he/she might be able to change 
his/her past, leading to temporal paradoxes typical of time travel fiction. 
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that it’s a matter of luck that we have a moral record at all.  Luck in regards to our existence, and 
our continued existence, is record luck, not moral luck. 
In contrast to complete control simpliciter, one has qualified complete control if and only 
if, at the time in question, given the actual past, what one does is up to her and her alone.  
Complete control simpliciter requires that at any given time, you can do anything and that 
nothing in the past or future could prevent you from having done that thing if you choose – even 
yourself; in contrast qualified complete control requires only that you have complete control over 
what you choose to do from the possibilities available to you at that time.  (The possibilities 
themselves are a matter of luck, but what you choose to do isn’t).  While complete control 
simpliciter is impossible for beings like us (perhaps even impossible altogether), we take it for 
granted that we have qualified complete control over our own free choices and actions. 
It is a matter of record luck whether or not we are given the chance to be morally 
responsible for anything, but when we are confronted with a situation where something is up to 
us, we have qualified complete control.  In virtue of this, for the rest of the dissertation I will 
refer to “qualified complete control” as complete control.  The most intuitive interpretation of the 
control principle is that moral responsibility requires complete control in this sense.  If this kind 
of control is impossible, then no one can be morally responsible for anything. 
2.3.2 Kinds of Moral Luck 
Thomas Nagel captures the thrust of the problem of moral luck quite nicely when he asks 
the “How is it possible to be more or less culpable depending on whether a child gets into the 
path of one's car, or a bird into the path of one's bullet?” (1976, 143)  If the control principle is 
true, the answer is that it’s not possible.  The problem is that there seem to be several distinct 
ways in which luck at least appears to play a role in determining our moral responsibility.  
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Nagel distinguishes between four types of luck that appear to play some role in 
determining an agent’s moral responsibility.  The first kind, resultant luck, is perhaps the most 
familiar candidate for moral luck, as it is concerned with how luck plays a role in determining 
the consequences of our actions.  For example, an agent may have complete control over whether 
or not she attempts to rob a bank, but whether or not she succeeds is ultimately up to factors 
outside of her control – a matter of resultant luck. 
Second, circumstantial luck is luck regarding the circumstances one faces, or as Nagel 
puts it, the “moral tests” that we are confronted with (1976, 145).  Nagel says “It may be true of 
someone that in a dangerous situation he would behave in a cowardly or heroic fashion, but if the 
situation never arises, he will never have the chance to distinguish or disgrace himself in this 
way, and his moral record will be different.”  Nagel presents the following example where 
circumstantial luck seems to influence one’s moral record:  Citizens of Nazi Germany, Nagel 
contends, had the opportunity to act morally and stand against the Nazi regime, or to act 
immorally by cooperating in the atrocities the Nazis were involved in.  Most are culpable, he 
claims, for choosing the latter.  However, many other people were never subjected to this test, 
and had they been so subjected, many of them would have behaved just as badly.  Because of 
luck alone these people never had to face this test, and may be differently morally responsible 
than they would have been had they faced the same test. 
Third, constitutive luck is luck regarding who one is.  Traditionally, constitutive luck has 
been seen as luck concerned primarily with one’s possession of certain character traits.  
However, recently Dana Nelkin has argued that constitutive luck also covers luck in our genes, 
our upbringing, and all kinds of environmental influences that contribute to determining who we 
are (2008).  Suppose that one’s upbringing causally determines that one have a certain kind of 
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character, say a vicious character, in such a way that the agent lacks any way to prevent coming 
to have this kind of character.  If agents are blameworthy for having such a vicious character, 
then their constitutive luck in regards to their character would be a case of moral luck.19 
Fourth, causal luck, sometimes called antecedent luck, is luck dealing with how our 
choices are determined or influenced by antecedent circumstances.  Causal luck is the most 
bizarre of the four kinds Nagel identifies.  He goes so far as to identify causal luck as the classic 
problem of free will.  However, causal luck doesn’t require determinism; even if determinism is 
false, probabilistic laws may also contribute causally such that our choices are influenced by 
antecedent circumstances.20  Some philosophers argue that causal luck is redundant and can be 
completely explained in terms of circumstantial and constitutive luck.21 
Zimmerman groups the last three kinds of luck together, calling them situational luck, as 
they each have to deal with the situation under which an agent chooses or acts.22  Resultant luck 
can be summarized as luck that follows one’s actions, while situational luck captures luck up to, 
and including, one’s actions.  In the following sections I will discuss each kind of luck in turn, 
and argue that kind of luck is not a legitimate case of moral luck.   
2.3.2.1 Resultant Luck 
Consider the following example of the problem of resultant luck that Zimmerman adapts 
from Nagel: 
Suppose that George shot at Henry and killed him. Suppose that Georg shot at Henrik in 
circumstances which were, to the extent possible, exactly like those of George (by which 
I mean to include what went on "inside" the protagonists' heads as well as what happened 
                                                 
19 Robert Merrihew Adams (1985) expressed just such a view. 
20 See Pereboom, 2002, 41-54 and Watson, 1982, 9. 
21 See Latus 2001. 
22 The distinction between resultant situational luck plays a central role in Zimmerman’s account, as he offers two 
distinct methods for showing why these kinds of luck doesn’t influence one’s moral record.  
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in the “outside” world), except for the fact that Georg's bullet was intercepted by a 
passing bird (a rather large and solid bird) and Henrik escaped injury. Inasmuch as the 
bird's flight was not in Georg's control, the thesis that luck is irrelevant to moral 
responsibility implies that George and Georg are equally morally responsible. This, I 
believe, is absolutely correct. (2002, 560) 
The fact that George is a murderer, while Georg is only an attempted murderer turns on 
resultant luck alone.  Zimmerman stipulates that George and Georg are the same situation – so 
situational luck is not an issue – and that they act in the same way.  Only the results of their 
actions differ.  Because moral responsibility tracks control, and thus is immune to luck, 
Zimmerman argues that both George and Georg must bear equal moral responsibility for what 
they’ve done – their moral ledgers, so to speak, have been equally stained.  The odd thing is that 
we’re inclined to say that they’ve done two radically different things.  George has killed Henry, 
while Georg hasn’t killed anyone; all he’s done is shot a bird!  What George has done is 
intuitively far worse than what Georg has done.  Surely both George and Georg are morally 
responsible for pulling the trigger with comparable intent, but George has done something Georg 
hasn’t done – succeeded.   
We’re inclined to say these two are morally responsible for the consequences of their 
actions; the puzzle is that if this is true, then they should be differently morally responsible.  
Afterall, Henry’s death is far, far worse than a bird’s being shot.  Further complicating the issue 
is that the results of Georg’s actions were accidental, a matter of luck undermining his intention, 
and thus not only is he morally responsible for something less bad, he is less responsible for it as 
well! 
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If George and Georg are differently morally responsible, they are so only because of luck, 
and thus the control principle is false.  However, it is at least prima facie intuitively plausible 
that George and Georg are equally morally responsible despite the fact that their actions have 
different consequences.  If this is true, then George and Georg must be morally responsible for 
something other than the actual consequences of their actions. 
It is prima facie intuitively plausible to say that George is blameworthy for Henry’s 
death; that his connection to Henry’s actual death is what makes him morally responsible.  
However, the same cannot be said for Georg, as Henrik doesn’t actually die.  What George and 
Georg do have in common is they both freely chose to kill their target.  All things being equal, 
this choice is prima facie intuitively true that both George and Georg are blameworthy for this 
choice.  If this choice is what they are, properly speaking, morally responsible for, then it makes 
sense to say that they are equally morally responsible because they have done the same kind of 
thing. 
The problem with this account is that the inherent badness of Henry’s actual death plays 
no role in determining George’s blameworthiness.  Because of this, it is at least prima facie 
inconsistent with our moral terminology – we say that George is blameworthy for Henry’s death 
when, all things being equal, according to this theory Henry could have survived and George 
would have been equally blameworthy.  This is to say that on this account Henry’s actual death 
makes no difference to George’s moral record, and thus, strictly speaking, it a mistake to say that 
George is morally responsible for Henry’s death. 
One solution23 to this problem, which I reject, is to say that one is morally responsible for 
not only the actual consequences of one’s actions, but the possible consequences of one’s actions 
                                                 
23 This possible solution to the problem of moral luck is one of my own design, but is modeled after Zimmerman’s 
solution to situational luck. 
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as well.  Because Georg could have killed Henrik, and George could have missed killing Henry, 
they are equally morally responsible on this account because although the actual consequences 
differ, the collective pool of active and merely possible consequences of their actions (by 
stipulation) match.  The problem with this account is that it, too, is vulnerable to luck.  George 
and Georg can be the same in all relevant respects up until, and including, their choice to kill 
their target.  However, unbeknownst to Georg, it may be completely impossible for him to kill 
his target (say unbeknownst to Georg, Henrik is immortal and bulletproof).  If this is the case, on 
this theory, Georg is less morally responsible than George is because his pool of possible 
consequences differs from George – and does so solely as a matter of luck. 
Both George and Georg lack complete control over whether their respective target dies.  
Any number of factors – from their grasp of the laws of nature, to the accuracy of their sense 
perceptions, to third party intervention (such as the bird) may prevent their intentional action 
from having the desired (or feared) effect.  They, like the rest of us, lack complete control over 
the results of their actions, and because of this, they cannot be morally responsible for the results 
of their actions according to the traditional interpretation of the control principle. 
Michael Zimmerman takes the position that only partial control is required for moral 
responsibility, and contends that George and Georg are equally morally responsible because they 
have the same amount of (partial) control over their respective target’s deaths.  For Zimmerman, 
moral responsibility is determined by (1) what one has (at least partial) control over, and (2) the 
degree of control one has over that thing.  Zimmerman stipulates that George and Georg have 
morally equivalent goals (their respective targets’ deaths) and equivalent control over these 
goals, and thus – in light of this – it makes sense to say that they are equally morally responsible. 
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It seems to me there are two distinct problems with Zimmerman’s account.  First, I am 
not sure what to make of Zimmerman’s contention that Georg has partial control over Henrik’s 
death.  Henrik doesn’t die, and the fact that he doesn’t die isn’t up to Georg at all.  Georg does 
his best to kill Henrik and fails.  When we say “George is blameworthy for Henry’s death”, it 
seems as if we are saying that there is something about Henry’s actual death that tracks back to 
George and stains his moral record.  But there can be no equivalent staining of Georg’s moral 
record, because Henrik doesn’t actually die.  Second, it seems odd to say that the less control one 
has over a situation, the less morally responsible one is.  Consider the following case: 
 Georgia hates Henrietta for the same kind of reasons that George hates Henry and Georg 
hates Henrik.  Georgia, however, is always up for a game of chance and attaches her rifle to a 
slot machine, such that when Georgia pulls the slot machine’s lever, the slot machine fires the 
rifle if and only if it comes up three of a kind.  Georgia sits atop a building and when Henrietta is 
lined up in her sites, Georgia pulls the trigger, the slot machine displays triple cherries, the 
weapon fires, and Henrietta is shot and killed. 
 In this case Georgia is in less control of her victim’s death than George is in control of 
Henry’s.  However, intuitively, she is as morally responsible as George.  In Georgia’s case, she 
is purposely less in control of Henrietta’s death than George is in control of Henry’s death, but 
this is no excuse.  Some might draw a distinction, and claim that Georgia is less morally 
responsible because she didn’t choose to kill Henrietta, but that she merely chose to risk 
Henrietta’s life – but this is a mistake. Georgia chooses to try to kill Henrietta and merely 
chooses a less reliable way to do so than George chooses to kill Henry.  We can, of course, 
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question Georgia’s rationale for choosing a less reliable way to commit murder, but for our 
purposes her moral responsibility for her choice of weapon is a separate issue.24  
Georgia is in less control over whether her victim dies than George is – but, intuitively, 
they are equally morally responsible for what they have done.  George and Georg have a 
different amount of control than Georgia, but are the same in every other relevant way, and yet 
all three are intuitively equally morally responsible. Thus suggests that the difference in the 
partial control they have over their actions does not play a role in determining their actual moral 
responsibility. 
Note, though, that there is something that all three have the same amount of control over 
– all three have complete control over their free choice to kill their respective targets.  And just 
as these agents have the same control over their intentional actions, Zimmerman stipulates that 
the mental content, or “what went on "inside" the protagonists' heads”, is equivalent. (2002, 560)  
In Zimmerman’s cases, he leaves this content unspecified – but surely this content matters.  
Zimmerman places the reader in the same position as the third party observer – we are ignorant 
of this content for George et al., but we can guess.  We assume that George and the like wanted 
to kill their respective targets; that it isn’t some accident or coincidence, and we do so because 
there tends to be a connection between our intentions and the outcomes of our actions. 
Embodied in the concept of intentional action is the idea that there is a regular connection 
between one’s intentions and what one intends to bring about.25  Anyone short of the radical 
skeptic presupposes that there is a regular connection between our beliefs about the world and 
                                                 
24 For example, say Georgia chose to drive to work, and then she chooses to drive her SUV instead of her hybrid.  
The proper moral evaluation of Georgia’s driving to work is, I think, a separate question from her moral 
responsibility to drive to work in her SUV instead of her hybrid.  Georgia can be completely morally justified in 
choosing to drive to work, while being completely morally blameworthy for her choice of what to drive to work. 
25 If one didn’t believe there was such a regular connection, contingent or otherwise, they would have no awareness 
of what their free actions would bring about, and have no basis to choose whether or not to act – thus failing to 
satisfy Aristotle’s awareness criteria. 
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how it actually is.  It follows from such a belief that there is a similar regular connection between 
what we believe our actions will bring about and what they will actually bring about.  And much 
like the former regular connection, this latter regular connection can be interrupted by both facts 
about the world we are ignorant of, and by our own biases and desires.  
Given this, there is a predisposition for the ignorant third party who knows only that 
George shot Henry to assume that George intended to shoot Henry.  Henry’s death is itself prima 
facie bad, so in the absence of some extenuating circumstances (such as if Henry was attempting 
to suicide bomb others), we are supposed to conclude that George’s intentions are bad.  But what 
makes George’s intentions bad just are that he intends to bring about Henry’s death (without any 
upside).  Henry’s actual death is bad, but on this view what makes George blameworthy is that 
his action is designed to bring about Henry’s death. 
But surely moral agents aren’t solely morally responsible for intentional actions.  Take 
the drunk driver, who accidentally hits a pedestrian on her way home.  All things being equal, 
she doesn’t intend to hit the pedestrian, but intuitively she is still blameworthy for it.  Although 
the drunk driver’s actions aren’t intentional, there is still a morally relevant epistemic connection 
between her choice to drive drunk (or, at least, a would-be driver’s choice to drink without taking 
steps ahead of time to ensure that she won’t drive) and her awareness of the possible 
consequences, including the possibility of a fatal accident.  This is to say that when the agent 
acted, she acted believing her action might cause certain outcomes.  While she may not have 
intended these outcomes, she freely and needlessly risks these outcomes through her free actions.   
When a moral agent acts intentionally, whether pulling a trigger or taking a drink, there 
are numerous epistemic connections that exist between the agent’s choice and her belief-sets and 
desire-sets.  For the remainder of this dissertation, by “epistemic connections” I mean epistemic 
 29
connections of this kind.  These epistemic connections are prima facie morally relevant; we tend 
to judge the ignorant person who unwittingly caused harm less morally blameworthy than the 
well-informed person who willingly and maliciously caused harm.  Indeed, if the ignorant person 
had no reason to believe her actions would cause harm, we often come to the conclusion that she 
might not be morally responsible at all.  However, when we find out that an apparent accident 
that causes harm was, in fact, planned out, we tend to judge the agent more morally blameworthy 
than had it merely been an accident.  For example, it is prima facie morally true that a drunk 
driver who hit a pedestrian would be less morally blameworthy than an assassin who uses a car 
to hit his target. 
I contend that agents who act intentionally and bring about a certain result are more 
morally responsible than agents who act intentionally and merely accidentally bring about the 
same result because the latter have fewer and weaker epistemic connections than the former.  
That is to say that the drunk driver has fewer and weaker epistemic connections to her belief that 
someone may die as a result of her actions than the assassin does. 
Identifying how various epistemic connections contribute to one’s moral responsibility is 
outside the scope of this dissertation.  However, it seems to me that there are three prima facie 
epistemic connections that play a substantial role in determining the agent’s moral responsibility 
– 1) what the agent intends26 her action to bring about, 2) what the agent expects her action to 
bring about27, and 3) what the action is designed to bring about.28  Other epistemic connections 
                                                 
26 By what the agent intends to bring about, I mean to capture only the reasons she chose to act on, not the reasons 
she had to act on, but didn’t chose to act on. 
27 Suppose Charlie is a level-headed person who, despite the odds, spends his life savings on lottery tickets, hoping 
to hit it big.  Although Charlie intends to win the lottery, and his actions are designed to do so, it would seem odd to 
say that he expects to win the lottery.  Given that he doesn’t expect to win the lottery, his choice is at least prima 
facie morally blameworthy, as he risks his well-being without good reason. 
28 Suppose Steve decides to marry Sheila.  Before his choice, Steve’s friends point out to him that there are two 
reasons for him to marry Sheila: (1) her family’s money will provide financial security, and (2) he will get to spend 
his life with the person he truly loves.  It makes sense to say that Steve can decide to marry Sheila solely because he 
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that affect one’s moral responsibility include the connection between the agent’s free choice and 
their beliefs about probabilities, their fears, their attention or inattention, their vigilance or 
negligence, etc.  The moral character of any given epistemic connection is likely self-evident 
even if the aggregate moral character of any given set of epistemic connections in a single action 
is not.   
In the case of the drunk driver, there is a less of an epistemic connection between her free 
choice and her belief that she might kill someone than there is between George et al.’s free 
choices and their beliefs that they might kill someone.  George et al. choose their actions because 
they are designed to bring about a death that they both intend and expect.  In contrast, the drunk 
driver’s action is (poorly) designed, intended, and expected to bring her home safely; and her 
choice to drink (without taking precautions) is designed, intended, and expected to, say, make 
her feel better.  In each of these actions, the would-be drunk driver exhibits no desire to hit any 
pedestrians, despite knowingly risking the outcome.  There are far29 fewer and weaker epistemic 
connections to the would-be drunk driver’s beliefs and desires about killing pedestrians than 
there epistemic connections between out assassins and their beliefs and desires about killing their 
respective targets. 
                                                                                                                                                             
wants to spend his life with the person he truly loves, even if Steve also desires financial security.  If Steve marries 
Sheila for love, it still makes sense to say that there is an epistemic connection between his marrying Sheila and his 
desire for financial security, but this epistemic connection played no role in Steve’s choice.  However, this is not to 
say that it is a weak epistemic connection, Steve believes that his action will result in financial security.  It is, 
however, weaker than had Steve chosen to marry Sheila for financial security, or out of a combination of both 
reasons. 
29 It is worth noting that the comparative weakness of the drunk driver’s epistemic connections to George et al. is 
somewhat misleading.  We tend to believe the drunk driver is substantially morally blameworthy despite the weak 
epistemic connections to her beliefs about the possibility of having an accident on the way home.  The severity of 
her blameworthiness is, in large part, determined not by the weak epistemic connection between her drinking and 
her expectation of risking a person’s life, but rather by the substantially strong epistemic connections between her 
action and her trivial akratic desires to feel better.  This is to say that the possible gains of her actions do not justify 
the risk she takes.  Her reckless regard for human life, while not the same, is at least comparable to the assassin’s 
disregard for life. 
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The epistemic connections between our free choices and our beliefs and desires help to 
explain our actions – George pulled the trigger to kill Henry.  The third party observer can, from 
witnessing the result, infer certain intentions, desires, and beliefs from the consequences of our 
actions.  Of course the observer has no direct contact with these epistemic connections behind 
the action, nor the beliefs and desires of the agent, and can only base their moral judgment on the 
facts at hand – the results of one’s actions.  Of course, our actions are designed to bring about 
certain results in the world – George acted to bring about Henry’s actual death, a natural evil.  
The problem is, ultimately, Henry’s death isn’t up to George – it’s a matter of luck whether 
George succeeds, or fails like Georg.  However, why he acted, given what he knew, is assumed 
to be within George’s complete control.  And this, I contend, is what George is morally 
responsible for. 
What should we make of our resultist language, then?  We say “George is morally 
responsible for killing Henry”, despite the fact that we believe that Georg is equally morally 
responsible despite not killing Henrik.  Their moral records are the same, but our commonsense 
moral language suggests otherwise.   
Some philosophers appeal to the concept of derivative moral responsibility to help make 
sense of our seemingly resultist linguistic practices.  To be derivatively morally responsible for 
something is to be morally responsible for some other thing and for that other thing to be 
connected to that something in some nontrivial, morally relevant way.  It is uncontroversially 
true that George is morally responsible for his free choice to shoot Henry (designed and acted on 
with the goal of bringing about Henry’s death), and given that we assume a regular connection 
between how we view the world and how it actually is there is a nontrivial connection between 
George’s action which he envisions will bring about Henry’s death and Henry’s actual death.  
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Because of this, it makes sense to say that George is derivatively morally responsible for Henry’s 
actual death. 
Some philosophers contend that derivative moral responsibility is a kind of moral 
responsibility.  I think this is a mistake.  To be morally responsible for something is to stand in a 
relationship to that thing such that if that thing is bad, one is morally blameworthy, and if that 
thing is good, one is morally praiseworthy.  To say that George is morally responsible for 
Henry’s death is generally understood as asserting that he is blameworthy for the natural evil of 
Henry’s death.  However, suppose George shoots Henry not to end his life, but to prevent Henry 
engaging in a suicide bombing.  If this were the case, then George acts to save other people, and 
shooting Henry is a means to that end.  All things being equal, it makes sense to say that if 
George shot Henry to save others, then George’s action is prima facie morally praiseworthy.  
And it is true that George is morally responsible for Henry’s death in this case – at least he is so, 
insofar as his action was designed to bring about Henry’s death (before he could bomb innocent 
people).  But, despite all this, Henry’s death is still a natural evil, but it does not make sense to 
attribute that natural evil to (heroic) George.  It is a bad thing that Henry, qua person, died, but 
George shot Henry to stop the bombing, not to bring about Henry’s death, and George’s actions 
are wholly praiseworthy.  George is causally responsible, but not morally blameworthy, for the 
natural evil of Henry’s death.   
In light of this, derivative moral responsibility is not actual moral responsibility; instead it 
is a byproduct of moral responsibility.  This is the case because the actual consequences of one’s 
actions play no role in determining whether one is praiseworthy or blameworthy; rather they 
provide the third party observer with evidence of the agent’s intentions and beliefs with which to 
judge one’s moral responsibility. Although we are derivatively morally responsible for many of 
 33
the consequences of our actions – consequences that are, ultimately a matter of luck – our moral 
record is not affected by them. 
2.3.2.2 Situational Luck 
 Above I’ve argued that the actual consequences of our actions are outside of our 
complete control, and thus we cannot be morally responsible for them.  Furthermore, I’ve argued 
that one can be causally responsible for, and intend to cause, an objectively bad result (the death 
of a suicide bomber) and despite causing a natural evil, lack any blameworthiness for doing so. 
 Now I turn to the problem of situational luck.  The question at hand is whether or not 
luck in the situations we face contributes to our blameworthiness or praiseworthiness.  If it does, 
then the control principle is false.  In the following three sections, I will discuss the three kinds 
of situational luck that are said to be candidates for moral luck – circumstantial luck, constitutive 
luck, and causal luck.  I will argue that although luck does, in fact, play a role in determining 
what situations we face, it does not play a role in determining what we do in these situations, and 
that is what we are, properly speaking, morally responsible for. 
2.3.2.2.1 Circumstantial Luck 
Thomas Nagel (1976, 145-147) defines circumstantial luck as luck in the circumstances 
we face, or more poetically “the things we are called upon to do, the moral tests we face”, which 
he argues are outside of our control.  For example, in a given situation, Nagel explains that an 
agent might act cowardly or heroic, but that if she hadn’t been confronted with that particular 
circumstance, her moral record would have different.  There are two ways in which the entries in 
one’s moral record can be different – in terms of (1) quantity, and (2) quality.   
When moral records differ in terms of quantity of entries, it is a matter of record luck, not 
moral luck.  Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the number of entries in one’s moral record 
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affects how blameworthy or praiseworthy a person is solely because of the number of entries.   
To illustrate this, consider the following case: 
Carol and Karol are virtuous moral agents whose lives are identical in every morally 
relevant way up until time t, at which point Carol makes a donation of $100 to a charity.  At t 
Karol makes one hundred donations of $1 to the same charity. 
It is prima facie true that Carol is no less morally praiseworthy for her single donation 
than Karol is for her hundred donations.  Indeed, if neither is aware of any good reason to make 
multiple donations, it seems that if there is any difference between them morally it is that Karol 
is less morally praiseworthy than Carol.  This is true because, all things being equal, Karol 
knowingly wastes her time, and the charity’s time, by making multiple donations.30  
Furthermore, if the reason Karol chose to make multiple donations is to appear as if she was 
more generous than Carol, she is prima facie morally blameworthy for this. 
Nagel’s contention, though, is that if an agent’s record differs in quality solely because of 
the circumstances she faces, then it would be a case of circumstantial moral luck.  He presents a 
case of circumstantial luck where two agents’ moral records differ substantially primarily 
because of luck in the circumstances they face.  Nagel’s case is as follows: 
“Ordinary citizens of Nazi Germany had an opportunity to behave heroically by opposing 
the regime. They also had an opportunity to behave badly, and most of them are culpable for 
having failed this test. But it is a test to which the citizens of other countries were not subjected, 
with the result that even if they, or some of them, would have behaved as badly as the Germans 
                                                 
30 This is based on the assumption that Karol is being wasteful, and being wasteful is prima facie morally wrong.  If 
being wasteful is not prima facie morally wrong, then Karol is not prima facie any more or less blameworthy or 
praiseworthy than Carol solely based on the number of entries in her moral record.  Furthermore, if we assume that 
there is at best a negligible amount of waste involved in making multiple donations rather than one (perhaps this is 
because a computer system handles the donations), then there is no prima facie rationale for distinguishing between 
Carol and Karol’s donations, morally speaking. 
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in like circumstances, they simply didn't and therefore are not similarly culpable.” (1976, 145-
146)   
The difference between a typical German and, say, a typical American in this case is that 
the German had an opportunity the American didn’t – one to act heroically or terribly.  Many 
Germans acted terribly, and we have good reason to think that many Americans, confronted with 
the same circumstances, would act equally viciously.  Yet we hold the vicious Germans morally 
culpable for their viciousness, but Nagel points out we do not hold the would-be vicious 
Americans as responsible.  If the German’s moral record differs from the Americans in part 
because of the circumstances he faces, then it would be a case of circumstantial moral luck. 
Nagel’s case is the premier example of a situation where circumstantial luck appears to 
influence one’s moral record.  However, the case is misleading in two ways.  First, although at 
first glance the case appears to be a case of differing quality of entries, upon closer analysis the 
case itself is just a case of differing entries – the German had at least one entry that is not 
comparable to what the American had.  Nagel tells us that this is a test the rest of us never had to 
face.  The American was, if you will, absent, for the “moral test” that faced the German.  
Although we might point to some other “moral test” that the American had to face at the same 
time, it is a different test – a test the German was similarly absent from.  This makes the case an 
instance of record luck, not moral luck.   
The supposition is that the majority of us are better off, morally, because we lucked into 
never having to take this test.  This leads us to the second misleading aspect of the case – the 
case turns on there being some objective fact about what the American, or any of us, would do in 
these same circumstances.  This seems to presuppose universal causal determinism, the theory 
that the actual past, coupled with the laws of nature, completely necessitate a unique future.  
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However universal causal determinism is incompatible with the control principle, as nothing 
would be up to us, rather anything we do would ultimately be a byproduct of something outside 
of our control that happened long before we were born.  Of course, we can guess what would 
have happened, and guess that many of us would have failed the moral test and behaved like the 
Germans actually behaved, and this guess is probably true.  However, this is akin to guessing 
about any undetermined outcome.  Suppose that we lived in a universe where coin flips were 
actually uncaused events, but where we’ve determined through observation that there are about 
as many coin flips that result in tails showing as heads.  To say that many Americans would have 
acted like the Germans did during World War II would be akin to saying that about 50% of these 
undetermined coin flips would come up heads.  It has no bearing on whether any given coinflip 
would turn up heads, or whether any coin flips would turn up heads. 
Suppose, though, that we don’t treat Nagel’s case as a case of record luck (that the 
Germans have an entry in their record that the American’s don’t), but as a case of circumstantial 
luck – say Jane and Janine live morally equivalent lives until time t, at which point they both 
hear a knock at the door.  Jane opens the door to find German soldiers asking for the location of 
Jewish persons to kill, while Janine opens the door to find Girl Scouts selling cookies.  Jane 
freely sells out her Jewish neighbors, while Janine freely buys a box of cookies.  It is at least 
prima facie true that Jane and Janine face moral challenges that differ radically in quality, not 
quantity.  Suppose we say that Jane and Janine both fail their moral tests (Jane fails her moral 
test because she is an accessory to murder, while Janine fails her moral test because she gives in 
to temptation and purchases something that (1) she can’t afford and (2) is bad for her health), 
surely the entries in their moral records differ substantially, and do so solely as a matter of luck. 
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Remember, though, moral luck would occur if and only if an agent is morally responsible 
for something outside of her control.  But it is uncontroversially true that no one is morally 
responsible for the circumstances one faces.31  Jane is no more morally blameworthy for opening 
the door to find German soldiers than Janine is for opening the door to find girl scouts.  Rather, 
Jane is morally blameworthy for the choice that she makes.  So, too, is Janine.  Both are morally 
responsible for something that is their doing, and thus the entries in their moral record are not a 
matter of moral luck. 
Perhaps the problem isn’t that Jane is given an opportunity that Janine wasn’t given – 
Jane is given an opportunity to kill her neighbors without punishment while Janine cannot kill 
the Girl Scouts without fear or punishment.  The supposition is that Janine is put in a position 
where there is nothing that she can do that is as bad (or good) as what Jane can do in her 
situation.  Janine is contingently less morally blameworthy than Jane, but had Jane done the right 
thing (what Nagel stipulates as acting “heroically”, whatever that entails) and Janine done the 
right thing then Janine would be less morally praiseworthy.  Coming to any serious conclusion 
about how morally blameworthy Jane or Janine are for their actions is outside the scope of this 
dissertation, but I take it that the intuitive thrust of Nagel’s case is that the German is much more 
blameworthy than the American.  In this case, we’re to believe that Jane is much more 
blameworthy than Janine.  The problem is that I haven’t stipulated anything about the inherently 
private mental states of either Jane or Janine; from their actions we’re supposed to infer that Jane 
willed, or at least willfully allowed, the death of her Jewish neighbors, while what Janine merely 
willfully spent money she couldn’t afford to spend on something that is bad for her. 
                                                 
31 Of course one can be derivatively morally responsible for the circumstances one faces, but this is just to say that 
the agent is morally responsible for putting herself in such a situation. 
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For the sake of argument, let’s assume that Jane is as the emotive appeal of the case 
would have us believe – that is to say that she freely turns in her neighbors knowing what will 
likely happen to them because she wants them to be tortured and killed despite the fact that she 
realizes they are inherently valuable moral agents.32  It seems at least prima facie possible that 
Janine could have done something as horrible as this at time t; for example she could have 
kidnapped the Girl Scouts, killed them, and buried them in her basement.  Suppose, though, 
Janine knew that she couldn’t kill the Girl Scouts and get away with it in the way that Jane 
would get away with her role in murdering her neighbors.  If this is the case, Janine could still 
have formed an intention to kidnap, kill, and bury in her basement the next person or persons she 
believed she could without getting caught. 
When I say Janine could have formed an intention here, I meant that she could have 
formed a predisposition to act under a given set of circumstances (in this case when she believed 
she could do so without getting caught).  Although moral agents may constantly revise their 
intentions over time, to form an intention just is to will that what you intend occur.  It is, thus, at 
least prima facie plausible that such predispositions to act can causally determine the agent to act 
in the specified circumstances without giving the agent a chance to reconsider.  In virtue of this, 
forming the intention to kill just is choosing to kill.  Thus if Janine formed the intention to kill 
the next group of people who she could get away with killing, she is prima facie morally 
blameworthy to a substantial degree; a degree that is at least prima facie as morally bad as Jane’s 
                                                 
32 We can, of course, imagine a sufficiently misinformed German who believes all Jewish people are evil demons 
sent to secretly undermine their power, ruin their lives, and kill them in their sleep.  Let us also assume this person is 
such that she is never put in a position where it is morally acceptable for her to reconsider the validity of her views.  
For such a person, turning in her Jewish neighbors would be akin to turning in evil demons – because that’s what 
she believes they are.  She has no control over how things actually are, she can only make choices based on what she 
believes. And by stipulation, what she believes is that there are evil demons out to get her.  To not turn in said evil 
demons would be to disrespect her own life, and is morally disgusting. 
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degree of blameworthiness for freely turning in her Jewish neighbors to the Nazis with the aim of 
getting them killed.33 
That said, it is at least prima facie morally possible that two agents who are morally 
equivalent up until time t can be confronted with situations where the worst possible thing the 
one agent can do is far worse than what the other agent can do.  But this problem just is a 
problem of record luck, not moral luck.  It is a situation where luck determines what 
circumstances one faces, but not how one reacts to these circumstances, and how one reacts just 
is what determines the entry in her moral record, not the circumstances themselves.  In the cases 
of Jane and Janine, what they do is up to themselves, to the agent herself, and that is all that the 
control principle requires. 
2.3.2.2 Constitutive Luck 
Constitutive luck is, broadly speaking, luck in who we are.  Traditionally the inquiry into 
constitutive luck has been primarily focused on luck in regards to an agent’s character traits, 
although more recently some inquiry has been focused on the role luck plays in determining who 
we are more broadly construed, including the sorts of agents we are, our biology, our upbringing, 
and the like.34 
The problem of constitutive luck is that it seems as if our character traits, our biology, our 
upbringing, etc. play a role in how we make our choices, what reasons we act on, and thus it is at 
least prima facie plausible that they play a role in determining how blameworthy or praiseworthy 
we are.  Robert Merrihew Adams, for example, argues that people with bad character traits are 
morally blameworthy simply because they have these character traits, regardless of how they 
                                                 
33 Of course many Germans probably engaged in similar actions with far less monstrous intentions than we are 
ascribing to Jane here.  Indeed, in many situations it may very well have been morally acceptable to turn in 
neighbors to protect one’s own family.  However, this is clearly not the kind of vicious actions Nagel’s case is meant 
to capture. 
34 See Dana Nelkin 2008. 
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come about, and this view seems at least prima facie plausible.35  But it is false.  Adams 
equivocates between the natural evil of certain character traits insofar as they tend to bring about 
bad consequences and being morally responsible for having these character traits. 
Some character traits may be causally determined by free choices an agent makes.  To the 
extent that an agent is aware that her actions may bring about a given character trait, it makes 
sense to say that agent is derivatively morally responsible for that character trait.  However, 
many character traits may be causally determined by external factors outside of their control.  If 
these traits rob an agent of free choice, they make it such that the agent is actually less morally 
responsible for having them, not more.  However, so long as an agent’s character traits do not 
completely causally necessitate her to act, then she can, at least in part, be the author of her 
actions.  It should be possible for an agent with a hindering or bad character trait to consistently 
act in a morally praiseworthy manner – indeed, this manner may, in fact, be more praiseworthy 
in virtue of the fact that acting in this manner may be more difficult because of one’s bad 
character.36 
It makes sense to say that some character traits, biological traits, or other traits are 
naturally evil or good insofar as they make it more or less likely that an agent will act in certain 
ways.  However, the likelihood of these character traits to cause harm is comparable to the 
likelihood of certain diseases to cause harm to others.  It would be absurd to hold sick moral 
agents morally responsible for simply being sick.  Why, then, is having a certain prima facie bad 
character trait any more blameworthy than having a certain prima facie bad illness?  In both 
cases we may have prima facie good reasons to distance ourselves from the agent in question, or 
even confine her for the public good, and in this sense I suppose we may treat her similarly to an 
                                                 
35 See Adams 1985. 
36 Because character traits are, at least in part, inherently private mental states, bad character traits may make it more 
difficult to accurately judge one’s moral responsibility from third party observation.   
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agent who is blameworthy, but these are also the same steps we might take when dealing with 
dangerous animals, dangerous weapons, or the like.  And there is no question that these things 
are not blameworthy for either their actions, or the causes of their actions. 
The idea that we are non-derivatively morally responsible for our character traits is 
absurd.  The idea that we could be morally responsible in any sense for our biology is similarly 
absurd.  Constitutive luck may very well affect whether one has a moral record (perhaps one is 
born without the biological framework necessary for certain mental events required for moral 
responsibility), and it may influence how others are inclined to judge one morally, but neither of 
these makes one any more or less morally praiseworthy or blameworthy for the actions which are 
in one’s control. 
It is important to note that moral agents are not morally responsible for the extent to 
which our character traits and/or biology determines our actions.  The thief whose character or 
biology, coupled with actual circumstances she facts, determines that she will steal is not morally 
responsible for her actions; although we can say that her character is (a) to blame (causally 
speaking), and that it is (b) a natural evil.  However, the thief whose character or biology just 
makes it more likely that she will steal, who then steals, is morally blameworthy for her actions; 
although the extent to which she is blameworthy is not the same as the thief without these 
character traits.  She is not less blameworthy because she has less control.  She is less 
blameworthy because she is only responsible for those things over which she has complete 
control, and she has fewer things over which she has complete control than the thief who has no 
bad character traits.  She is, however, more blameworthy than the nomically necessitated thief, as 
the latter lacked complete control over her stealing. 
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An agent’s character traits and biology are just part of the circumstances an agent is 
confronted with.  As such, constitutive luck just is a matter of circumstantial luck, and as we’ve 
seen circumstantial luck isn’t a kind of moral luck.  At best, it’s a kind of record luck. 
2.3.2.3 Causal Luck 
Nagel contends that the problem of causal luck just is the problem of free will – for him, 
moral agents are, ultimately, causally determined at every step, and thus there is nothing which is 
really up to us in any robust sense that would satisfy the control principle.  Nagel contends that 
the problem of causal luck defies solution.  I think this is a mistake.  If universal causal 
determinism is true at the actual world, then no one can ever be morally responsible for anything 
– at least no one can be morally responsible in the sense discussed by Aristotle and compatible 
with the control principle. 
However, it is at least prima facie plausible that the actual world could be governed by 
indeterministic laws of nature, such that at any given time there can be multiple possible futures.  
There are at least two prima facie plausible ways in which an agent’s actions can be 
undetermined.  First, an agent’s actions can be caused randomly, by chance.  Indeterminism of 
this kind of no more consistent with the control principle than determinism is.37 
Second, an agent’s actions can be caused by the agent herself; this is to say that moral 
agents can be first causes, or authors, of their actions – actions which can be, at least in theory, 
based upon prior circumstances or luck, but not caused by them.  Many philosophers have 
challenged the coherence of such a position, but the notion that moral agents can have such non-
                                                 
37 Some philosophers contend that universal causal determinism is more compatible with the control principle than 
universal indeterminism of this kind.  While I admit universal causal determinism might make the world more 
predictable, I fail to see how an agent can be any more in control of the state of the universe at its creation (from 
which in a completely deterministic universe every future event is completely causally determined) than by 
something undetermined, such as a truly random coin flip or, perhaps, the location of an electron in an atom’s 
electron cloud. 
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arbitrary control over their actions is at least prima facie intuitively plausible.  It is this kind of 
control that libertarians believe is necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility, and this kind 
of control that both Aristotle and the control principle seem to require for moral responsibility.  
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Chapter 3:  The Principle of Alternate Possibilities 
3.1 Introduction 
 There is something genuinely wrongheaded about the idea that someone can be morally 
responsible for something outside of her control.  The idea that moral responsibility requires 
control is so central to the concept that to even consider responsibility without control is to 
contemplate something else.38  Despite consensus on the validity of the control principle, though, 
there is much disagreement about what kind of control it requires.  According to Aristotle’s 
control condition, to be morally responsible for her actions, an agent must be the cause of her 
actions in the right way.  All too often, at this point, the debate shifts from questions about the 
kind of control that is prima facie intuitively required for moral responsibility, to questions about 
what kind of causation is possible at the actual world. 
The rationale for the shift is simple – we are first and foremost interested in facts about 
the actual world, our interest in other possible worlds is largely only academic.  If we take our 
moral intuitions and beliefs to be indicative of facts about the world, then we are committed to 
the following two propositions:  (1) moral responsibility is possible, and (2) right now there exist 
moral agents who are capable of being morally responsible for things, many of whom are 
actually morally responsible, and we are agents of this kind.   If (1) is true, then the causation 
required for an agent to be morally responsible must be possible, and if (2) is true, it must occur 
at the actual world. 
                                                 
38 For example, revisionists about moral responsibility suggest that moral responsibility, of the kind discussed by 
Aristotle, Kant, and the like, is impossible and/or incoherent.  In light of this, they contend we ought to revise our 
definition of the term to be applicable to the actual world.   I will deal with questions of the coherence of libertarian 
theories of moral responsibility in the next chapter. 
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The problem with this shift of focus is twofold – (i) it is at least theoretically possible that 
we are not actually moral agents, and thus are not morally responsible for anything39, and if this 
were the case, (2) is false, and our commitment to the truth of (2) needs to be explained in some 
way other than by the truth of (2); (ii) despite the long and sordid history of philosophical debate 
surrounding compatibilism and incompatibilism, we are no closer to a theory of causation that is 
supported by the empirical evidence of our best scientific theories than when Hume defined 
causation as mere “constant conjunction” of two objects.40  In light of this, shifting focus from 
the ill-defined concept of control to the more mysterious concept of causation seems only to 
confuse the issue, and invite disaster. 
Due to the apparently intractable nature of the debate over the proper interpretation of 
CP, a separate, but equally prima facie intuitively plausible, principle is often treated as a 
surrogate for CP – the principle of alternate possibilities41: 
The principle of alternate possibilities:  For a moral agent to be morally responsible for 
some action requires that she could have done otherwise. (AP from now on.) 
While the control principle articulates necessary and sufficient conditions for moral 
responsibility, the principle of alternate possibilities only articulates a necessary condition for 
moral responsibility – to be morally responsible for something, one needs at least to have the 
alternate possibilities, or the ability to do otherwise.  When a moral agent is confronted with a 
                                                 
39 For example, many incompatibilists ascribe to the theory that moral agents can be first-causes, or uncaused-
causes, of their actions.  It is plausible that we have mistaken ourselves for these kinds of agents when really, as the 
determinist claims, we are completely causally determined to act by antecedent circumstances.  It is another question 
altogether whether agents of the kind we believe ourselves to be actually exist. 
40 See Hoefer 2008, Hume, 1999, pg. 121. 
41 CP is supposed to articulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for moral responsibility, while the principle of 
alternate possibilities merely articulates necessary conditions for moral responsibility.  This is to say that not 
everything that has alternate possibilities is a moral agent.  For example, some theories suggest that an electron’s 
path in the electron cloud surrounding an atom is undetermined, such that an electron has multiple possible locations 
where it can move to given the actual past.  If this is the case, it makes sense to say that the electron had alternate 
possibilities, or could have done otherwise, but it is clearly not morally responsible for where it goes. 
 46
situation where she literally has no choice about what she does, she is not morally responsible 
for what she does because what she does wasn’t up to her in any relevant sense. 
The principle of alternate possibilities allows us to distinguish between moral agents 
acting qua moral agents, and moral agents who are acted upon, or caused to act.  For example, 
AP explains our intuitions about the following pair of cases: 
The Diving Cases: 
At time t John is standing atop a diving board and spots Joan near the pool below.  He 
decides to jump into the pool with the intention of splashing Joan, jumps, and succeeds in 
splashing Joan. 
At time t Jon is standing atop a different diving board and notices Joann near the pool 
below.  Before Jon can choose what to do, Jack sneaks up behind him and pushes him off 
the board into the pool.  When Jon falls into the pool, Joann is splashed as a result. 
The difference between John and Jon is that the former had a choice, and freely chose not only to 
jump into the pool, but to do so to splash Joan, while the latter had no say in what he did.  If John 
is capable of the sort of action-authorship CP requires for moral responsibility, it’s up to him 
whether or not he would jump a t, and for what reasons.  But this is to say that he could have 
done otherwise, he could have chosen not to jump at t, or he could have chosen to jump at t for 
different reasons.  Jon lacks this control, and this is at least signaled by his inability to do 
otherwise. 
Traditionally, the principle of alternate possibilities has shared the same sort of near-
universal acceptance of CP… at least until some forty years ago in his now infamous paper 
“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” Harry Frankfurt broke with tradition and 
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argued that AP is false.42  Frankfurt constructs a case in which he believes he has shown that an 
agent lacks alternate possibilities, but despite this it is at least prima facie true that he is morally 
responsible for what he has done.  If Frankfurt’s case holds up to scrutiny, not only AP false, but 
any meaningful account of CP is as well.  
In this chapter I will show that Frankfurt fails to show that AP is false.  Following this, I 
look at several recent variations of Frankfurt-style cases and show that they, too, fail to 
demonstrate the falsity AP. 
3.1 Frankfurt Cases 
Frankfurt sets out to construct a case where an agent is prima facie morally responsible 
despite lacking alternate possibilities.  I will call all cases constructed with this goal “Frankfurt 
cases”.  Let any Frankfurt case that succeeds in demonstrating that an agent can be morally 
responsible for what they’ve done despite lacking alternate possibilities a “true Frankfurt case”.  
A true Frankfurt case would be a counterexample to AP, and demonstrate its falsity.  All 
(honestly presented) Frankfurt cases are meant to be true Frankfurt cases, but without exception 
the prominent Frankfurt cases fail to demonstrate the falsity of AP.  I believe there are no true 
Frankfurt cases.  Below I will discuss Frankfurt’s original cases, as well as two recent variations, 
and I will show that each of these cases fails to be a true counterexample to AP. 
3.3.1 The Original Frankfurt Case 
                                                 
42 Frankfurt, Harry G., 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, 
No. 23: 829-839. 
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Frankfurt’s infamous case is meant to be a situation where an agent – Jones443 – is 
morally responsible for his action, despite the fact that it is prima facie clear that he could not 
have done otherwise: 
Suppose someone – Black, let us say – wants Jones4 to perform a certain action. Black is 
prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing his 
hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones4 is about to make up his mind what to do, and 
he does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that 
Jones4 is going to decide to do something other than what he wants him to do. If it does 
become clear that Jones4 is going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective 
steps to ensure that Jones4 decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him to do. 
Whatever Jones4's initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black will have his way.  
(835) 
 
Now suppose that Black never has to show his hand because Jones4, for reasons of his 
own, decides to perform and does perform the very action Black wants him to perform. In 
that case, it seems clear, Jones4 will bear precisely the same moral responsibility for what 
he does as he would have borne if Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that 
he do it. It would be quite unreasonable to excuse Jones4 for his action, or to withhold the 
praise to which it would normally entitle him, on the basis of the fact that he could not 
have done otherwise. (836) 
There is a lot to unfurl here, but before we tackle that monster we should be clear about 
what Frankfurt believes this case shows.  Frankfurt says, “[The principle of alternate 
                                                 
43 Frankfurt begins “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” by arguing that the coercion principle is false.  
He offers three cases, featuring Jones1, Jones2, and Jones3.  Frankfurt believes his Jones3 case to be an example where 
Jones3 is morally responsible, despite being coerced, and the Jones4 is a variation of this case. 
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possibility’s] exact meaning is a subject of controversy, particularly concerning whether 
someone who accepts it is thereby committed to believing that moral responsibility and 
determinism are incompatible. Practically no one, however, seems inclined to deny or even to 
question that the principle of alternate possibilities (construed in some way or other) is true.”  
But Frankfurt believes that all (charitable) interpretations of AP are false, regardless of the 
(charitable) sense of “could have done otherwise” that AP is concerned with. 
However I think there is at least one reasonably charitable interpretation of AP that even 
a cursory interpretation of Frankfurt’s case in no way casts doubt upon: 
The weak principle of alternate possibilities:  A prerequisite for a moral agent’s being 
morally responsible for acting in such and such a way is that, for that agent, there is some 
imaginable situation where she would or could have done otherwise.  (WAP from now 
on.) 
 It is utterly uncontroversial that in Frankfurt’s case, Jones4, sans Black’s involvement, 
would have alternate possibilities.  It is also utterly uncontroversial that Jones4, lacking any 
indication of Black’s presence, believes that he has alternate possibilities (in whatever sense he 
believes is required for moral responsibility).  Furthermore, Black – an excellent judge of such 
things – believed that it was an open question what Jones4 would decide to do.  As such, this case 
isn’t a counterexample to WAP, and Frankfurt hasn’t shown that any reasonably charitable 
interpretation of AP is false.  I believe that WAP is far too inclusive to accurately capture our 
intuitions concerning alternate possibilities44 – after all, I can imagine, in some sense, devoting 
my life to curing cancer and magically discovering a cure, but the mere fact I can imagine myself 
doing so doesn’t seem relevant at all to whether or not I am blameworthy for not curing cancer.   
                                                 
44 Note that WAP, unlike AP, is remarkably consistent with compatibilism. 
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The rest of this chapter will focus on more traditional, commonsense interpretations of 
AP, and I will argue that Frankfurt’s case fails be a true counterexample to AP. 
 For the Black case to be a true Frankfurt case, it must be the case that (1) Jones4 is 
morally responsible for something, and (2) that he couldn’t have done otherwise than to do that 
thing.  Frankfurt believes (1) is self-evident in this case – it is supposed to be prima facie true 
that Jones4 is morally responsible for what he does because he does so freely, believing that he 
could have done otherwise.  Black’s involvement is supposed to secure the truth of (2).  The 
biggest problem with the Black case is that it’s not at all clear how Black’s involvement makes it 
the case that Jones4 can’t do otherwise.45 
 Frankfurt tells us that the exact meaning of the principle of alternate possibilities is a 
“subject of controversy” (829), and the terms “alternate possibilities” and “could have done 
otherwise” are no less mysterious.  However, to understand how Black makes it such that Jones4 
can’t do otherwise, we must first give some tentative account of what alternate possibilities are 
(such that we know whether or not Black effectively cut them off in the case).   
The most commonsense interpretation of what it is for you to have alternate possibilities 
is for you to have two or more different possible actions (or sets of actions) actually open to you, 
given the action past, when you chose to act.  To have had alternate possibilities, then, is to have 
had the ability to do not only what you actually did, but to have had the ability to do something 
else than what you actually did, and for you not to have done so. 
                                                 
45 Frankfurt contends that he example is flexible enough to allow the removal of Black in favor of natural forces of a 
machine.  David Blumenfeld, 1971, offers an alternative, replacing Black’s machinations for a form of radiation that 
triggers when Jones blushes.   If Jones were to consider doing other than the radiation would have him do, he 
blushes.  Blumfeld’s example differs from Frankfurt’s in two ways – trivially, it replaces the overly theatrical Black 
with a bizarre natural event – no problems there.  Second, rather than intervene only when Jones is about to choose 
otherwise, the radiations intervenes whenever Jones even considers choosing otherwise.  This deviation, I think, 
only makes it more susceptible to the Kane/Widerker objection I discuss below. 
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There are other, less commonsense, accounts of alternate possibilities, most prominent of 
which is the necessitarian compatibilist position that states that one has alternate possibilities if 
and only if, had the past been different in some relevant way, one would have been causally 
determined to do otherwise.  On this account of alternate possibilities, a murderer who is 
completely causally determined to murder has alternate possibilities if, had the past been 
different, she would have done otherwise.  The problem with this account is twofold – first, this 
would be a case a situational moral luck – what makes such a murderer morally blameworthy is a 
matter of luck, how the actual past causally necessitates her to act, and is thus outside of her 
control.  Second, on this account, everyone has alternate possibilities all the time.  This is to say 
that there would be no instances where one lacked moral responsibility because they lacked 
alternate possibilities, because in every single case, had the actual past been different in some 
way or another, one would have done otherwise. 
If the necessitartian account of alternate possibilities is correct, it is never the case that 
anyone lacks alternate possibilities for anything.  But this is, to a large degree, inconsistent with 
the commonsense interpretation of AP, and thus I will focus exclusively on the more 
commonsense interpretation of alternate possibilities. 
Frankfurt believes that every (charitable) interpretation of AP is false, thus for the Black 
case to do what Frankfurt believes it does – provide a counterexample to AP – it must show that 
Jones4 had no alternate possibilities in any charitable account of alternate possibilities.46  In what 
follows I will show that there is no coherent interpretation of the Black case in which Jones both 
(a) lacks alternate possibilities and (b) is morally responsible for what he has done. 
                                                 
46 Note that in Frankfurt’s case, Jones has alternate possibilities in the necessitarian sense, as had things been 
differently – say, had Black not been involved, and had Jones been causally necessitated to choose differently – he 
would have done otherwise.  However, the necessitartian sense of alternate possibilities is far from a charitable 
interpretation of the kind of alternate possibilities AP requires, and thus should not count as evidence against 
Frankfurt’s case as a counterexample to AP. 
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 Frankfurt believes that in the Black case, Black’s potential involvement makes it the case 
that Jones doesn’t have alternate possibilities; however given how the case is presented it’s not at 
all clear how Black’s potential involvement does this.  In the next three sections I will discuss 
three interpretations of the Black case, and I argue that each of these interpretations fails to show 
that AP is false.  
3.3.1.1 Black Case Version 1:  The Tell 
 The first version of the case I will discuss is a version derived from comments Frankfurt 
makes in a footnote; he says, “The assumption that Black can predict what Jones4 will decide to 
do does not beg the question of determinism” (835).  Frankfurt reasons that, perhaps, Black has 
studied Jones and has learned that Jones tends to exhibit a certain tell – a twitch – before 
deciding how to act in cases like this, and that in the past the twitch has always signified that he 
would act in one way rather than the other, and that this twitch or lack thereof would give Black 
a good indication of what Jones was about to do. 
Version 1:  The Tell 
Black wants Jones to perform some task A.  He has the ability to force Jones to choose to 
A if he hasn’t already chosen to ~A, but would rather Jones freely choose to A than be 
forced to choose A.  Black is familiar with Jones and believes that if Jones is going to 
choose to ~A he will exhibit a noticeable twitch at some point before he decides.  As it so 
happens, Jones exhibits no twitch, and does what Black wants him to do: A.  Jones is 
completely unaware of Black. 
In this case, Frankfurt would contend that (1) Jones is uncontroversially morally responsible for 
his Aing, where to A is some action like stealing Smith’s car, killing Smith, or jaywalking, and 
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(2) Jones lacked alternate possibilities because if he were going to choose to do otherwise, Black 
would have noticed the twitch and stepped in before his choice to make sure that he chose to A. 
Robert Kane and David Widerker have independently raised an objection to this 
interpretation of the Black case that has come to be known as the Kane/Widerker objection.47  
The objection is as follows:  Either (A) Jones’s twitch is causally related to Jones’s decision by 
some deterministic process involved in his making a choice, such that either (i) Jones chooses 
before he would make the twitch, in such a way that if Jones twitches, he has already chosen to 
~A, and thus Black is too late to intervene, or (ii) both the twitch and Jones’s choice are wholly 
causally determined by some prior determining factor; or (B) Jones’s twitch is not causally 
related to Jones’s decision, and thus any perceived connection on the part of Black is just 
coincidence. 
If (A)(i), then if Black were to wait for a twitch to intervene, he would be too late to 
intervene before Jones made his choice and thus (2) is false – Jones could have chosen to ~A, 
and as it is too late for Black to interfere, he would have succeeded in ~Aing.  If (A)(ii), Kane 
and Widerker contend that incompatibilists – those who believe determinism is incompatible 
with moral responsibility – would not have the intuition that Jones is morally responsible for his 
action, and thus at least incompatibilists have good reason to believe that (1) is false in this case.  
The elegance of the Black case is that Jones is supposed to be uncontroversially morally 
responsible for his action – but in (A)(ii) this isn’t the case.  If (B), then Jones’s twitch or lack of 
a twitch is not causally related to his choice, despite Black’s belief to the contrary, and thus 
Black cannot ensure that Jones As simply by waiting for a twitch because Jones can ~A despite 
his not twitching, and thus (2) is false. 
                                                 
47 See Kane 1985, 1996b; Widerker 1995. 
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The Kane/Widerker objection shows that there is no way to interpret this version of the 
Black case where we’re inclined to believe that both (1) and (2) are true – that is to say that there 
is no way to interpret it such that Jones is uncontroversially morally responsible and Black has 
the ability to make sure that Jones doesn’t do otherwise. 
3.3.1.2 Black Case Version 2:  Reprogramming 
The problem with the above case is that if Frankfurt doesn’t beg the question about 
determinism, and the twitch is not causally connected to the choice, then Black has no way to 
ensure Jones will A if he can only act before Jones’s free choice.  However, Frankfurt seems 
committed to the proposition that Jones can’t do other than actually Aing, not that he can’t do 
other than choosing to A.  In the following version of the case, if Black intervenes, he does so 
only after Jones’s choice to ~A, effectively sidestepping questions of how Black would predict 
Jones’s choice. 
Version 2:  Reprogramming 
Black wants Jones to perform some task A.  He has the ability to make Jones A, but 
would rather Jones A because he freely chooses to.  Black has a sixth sense that allows 
him to know what other people have chosen to do.  Black knows that between Jones’s 
choosing to ~A and his ~Aing, there would be time for him to reprogram Jones to believe 
that he had chosen to A such that Jones will A instead of ~A.  As it so happens, Jones 
chooses to A, and Black does nothing.  Jones is completely unaware of Black. 
If this is the right interpretation of the Black case, Frankfurt would contend that (1) Jones is 
uncontroversially morally responsible for his Aing, and (2) Jones lacked alternate possibilities. 
This case allows for two series of events – either (A) Jones freely chooses to A and his 
free choice causes him to A, or (B) Jones freely chooses to ~A, Black intervenes to make Jones 
 55
believe that he had actually chosen to A, and this causes Jones to A.  If (A), it is 
uncontroversially true that Jones is morally responsible for Aing.  However, if (B) it seems 
equally uncontroversially true that Jones isn’t morally responsible for Aing. 
However, Frankfurt’s position seems to be that if (A), Jones is morally responsible for the 
outcome of his free choice – his actual Aing, and that he could not do otherwise because if (B), 
he would have still Aed, even though he is not morally responsible for having Aed.  But this is 
because if Black intervenes, then, properly speaking, Jones has already done otherwise – he has 
chosen to ~A, and thus (2) is false – Jones can either choose to A or choose to ~A, and thus he 
has alternate possibilities. 
Frankfurt’s position seems to turn on the fact that even though Jones had alternate 
possibilities to choosing to A, Black makes it the case that he doesn’t have alternate possibilities 
to actually Aing; no matter what Jones does, he will A, and if he As because he freely choose to 
do so, he is morally responsible for Aing.  The problem with this account is that Frankfurt seems 
to think there is no difference between Jones’s freely Aing and Jones’s being causally 
determined to A; for him they are the same possibility.  But this is bizarre – it’s true that (A) and 
(B) have the same outcome, Jones As, but surely Jones’s freely Aing is a different thing than 
Jones’s being forced to A. 
If this version of the Black case is a counterexample to anything, it’s a counterexample to 
the following interpretation of AP: 
The principle of alternate outcomes:  A moral agent is only morally responsible for 
acting in such and such a way if she could have brought about a different outcome.  (AO 
from now on.) 
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AO derives whatever prima facie intuitive plausibility it has from the fact that in most cases 
where an agent is morally responsible for something, they could have brought about a different 
outcome.  However, whether we can, in fact, bring about a different outcome is uncontroversially 
outside of our control.  Insofar as AP derives its notoriety for being a surrogate for CP, any 
interpretation of AP that is consistent with holding someone morally responsible for something 
over which they lack control is an uncharitable one. 
Frankfurt is well aware of the controversy over the exact meaning of AP, so it would be 
uncharitable to interpret him as constructing the Black case to be a counterexample to this rather 
uncharitable interpretation of AP.  More importantly, even if Frankfurt believed that the best 
interpretation of AP was AO, he wouldn’t need to resort to a bizarre case like the Black case for 
a counterexample. Consider the following case:   
 The Smiths Case: 
Mr. Smith has fallen over the side of the boat, but Mrs. Smith caught his hand as he fell.  
Mrs. Smith holds onto her husband, but her grip is beginning to slip.  She calls for help, 
but unbeknownst to her, help will not arrive before the limits of her physical endurance 
are reached and she is forced to let go.  For a while, Mrs. Smith has two options – hold 
on, or let go.  Again, unbeknownst to her, the outcome will be the same either way – at 
some point t2, she would reach her physical limits and be causally determined to let go 
and Mr. Smith would fall to his doom.  However, Mrs. Smith lets go at t1, where t1 is 
some time before t2, and Mr. Smith falls to his doom.  
I think it’s blatantly obvious that Mrs. Smith is morally responsible for letting her 
husband fall despite the fact that, unbeknownst to her, the outcome would have been the same 
had she held on as long as she could.  We don’t need to posit any Black-like evil demons that 
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may or may not manipulate Mrs. Smith – and in that respect, the Smiths case would be far more 
elegant than the Black case to demonstrate the falsity of AO. 
One might object that in the Smiths case, there are, in fact, alternate possible outcomes – 
the limits of Mrs. Smith’s physical endurances may mean that she can hold on to some time t2, 
but in the case she actually lets go at some time long before t2, t1.  Either – Mr. Smith falls at t1, 
or Mr. Smith falls at t2.  If these are two different outcomes, this is not a counterexample to AO.  
If you have such concerns, consider the following case: 
A Second Smiths Case: 
Mr. Smith has fallen over the side of the boat, but Mrs. Smith caught his hand as he fell.  
Mrs. Smith holds onto her husband, but her grip is beginning to slip.  She calls for help, 
but unbeknownst to her, at time t2 her body will experience an involuntary spasm 
causally determined by an undetermined event at t1 that will cause her to let go of her 
husband unless, at t1 she freely decides to let go of her husband which causes her to freely 
let go at t2, and prevents the involuntary spasm at t2.  Mrs. Smith freely chooses, at t1, to 
let go of her husband. 
Regardless of what Mrs. Smith does, there is only one outcome or result– at t2, she will 
let go of her husband’s hand.  Yet it seems prima facie true that Mrs. Smith is morally 
responsible for letting her husband fall in this case, despite the fact that there were no alternate 
outcomes.  Thus AO is false.  This case – or something close to it – is a far better 
counterexample to AO than the Black case, if only because we don’t have to posit the existence 
of someone like Black.  This suggests that Frankfurt doesn’t intend his Black case to be a 
counterexample to AO.  AO isn’t only false – it’s obviously false.  Charity dictates that Frankfurt 
believes there is something more to alternate possibilities than alternate outcomes, and must 
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believe that some interpretation of the Black case demonstrates that Jones lacks alternate 
possibilities, not merely alternate outcomes. 
3.3.1.3 Black Case Version 3:  Choose Again 
In the following version of the Black case, Black sets up a situation where rather than 
forcing Jones to A, if Jones chooses to ~A, Black sets up a scenario where Jones will keep 
reconsidering his choice until such time that he chooses to A. 
Version 3:  Choose Again 
Black wants Jones to perform some task A.  He would rather Jones freely choose to A 
without his intervention, but if Jones chooses to ~A, Black will know it thanks to a sixth 
sense.  If Jones chooses to ~A, Black will have enough time to set in motion a series of 
events that will cause Jones to reconsider his choice to ~A.  Furthermore, Black has set 
up a series of events that escalate the appeal of A such that he is sure that at some point 
Jones will ultimately choose to A.  As it so happens, Jones chooses to A, and Black does 
nothing.  Jones is completely unaware of Black. 
If this is a proper way to interpret the Black case, Frankfurt would be asking us to believe (1) 
Jones is uncontroversially morally responsible for his Aing, and (2) Jones lacked alternate 
possibilities because we would eventually freely choose to A. 
The problem with this case is that it is fairly obvious that Jones does, in fact, have 
alternate possibilities, he can choose to A on the first attempt, or not.  Regardless of what Black 
does, Jones is uncontroversially morally responsible for his choice here, even if he chooses to ~A 
and later changes his mind.  Jones has alternate possibilities here in the same sense that Mrs. 
Smith does in the first Smiths case above – he A at his first opportunity, or A later.   
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But there is another problem with the case itself – how can Black be sure that Jones will 
ultimately choose to A without assuming determinism?  Suppose that the series of events Black 
sets up are a series of threats against Jones, such that it would be irrational for Jones to choose to 
~A.  This alone does not make it the case that Jones has to choose to A (although it may make it 
the case that Jones should choose to A), as surely Jones can act irrationally.  To assume Jones is 
causally determined to act rationally just is to beg the question about determinism, and thus fail 
to demonstrate that Jones is uncontroversially morally responsible. 
There seems to be no interpretation of the Black case such that Jones is both 
uncontroversially morally responsible and lacks alternate possibilities.  Why, then, are so many 
convinced Frankfurt has found a genuine counterexample to AP?  I believe this is the result of an 
equivocation.  The Black case makes it easy to equivocate between Jones as a free moral agent 
making his own choices and Jones as Black’s puppet being causally determined to act.  It is 
uncontroversially true that if Jones’s choices are up to him, then he is morally responsible for 
them.  But it is equally uncontroversially true that if Black somehow usurps Jones’s free will, 
then Jones, qua moral agent does nothing.  Thus, Jones does have alternate possibilities – he, qua 
moral agent, can A, or he, qua physical body, can A, and these are two distinct things.  In the 
former, Jones acts, in the latter, he is acted upon. 
Further complicating the issue is that our commonsense moral linguistic conventions 
seem to suggest that moral agents are at least partially morally responsible for the results of their 
actions.  In the previous chapter, I argued that it only makes sense to say that agents are 
derivatively morally responsible for the consequences of their actions, that this responsibility is a 
byproduct of one’s moral responsibility for one’s free choices, and that derivative moral 
responsibility in no way contributes to one’s moral record.  Thus, even though it makes sense to 
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say that Jones is morally responsible for Aing when he freely As, this responsibility is wholly 
derivative of his free choice to A, and his actual Aing (or failing to A, for example should some 
shadowy figure, White, use his near-godlike abilities to ensure Black’s plans fail by causing 
Jones to ~A in much the same way, but better, that Black would cause Jones to A) does not 
contribute to his moral record. 
 Frankfurt’s goal is to show that Jones lacks alternate possibilities, and yet is 
uncontroversially morally responsible for what he does.  However, in each version of the Black 
case discussed above, he fails to show this.  In the first case, either Jones is completely causally 
determined to act as he does, and thus not uncontroversially morally responsible for what he 
does, or he has alternate possibilities.  In the second, Jones lacks alternate outcomes, not 
alternate possibilities.  In the third case, the best Frankfurt could hope to show is that Jones lacks 
alternate outcomes, and but he clearly has alternate possibilities even if he lacks alternate 
outcomes. 
3.3.1.4 Mele and Robb’s Frankfurt Case 
Many contemporary philosophers realize that the Black case fails to live up to Frankfurt’s 
desires, but believe that Frankfurt has shown them the way to constructing actual 
counterexamples to AP.  Two such cases in particular seem promising –first, a case by Alfred 
Mele and David Robb48 offers a cutting-edge account of Black’s mysterious power; second a 
case by Derk Pereboom49 purports to be a situation where although an agent has alternate 
possibilities, he lacks morally robust alternate possibilities and thus lacks alternate possibilities 
in the moral sense.  Mele and Robb’s case is as follows: 
Mele and Robb’s Frankfurt case: 
                                                 
48 See Mele &Robb 1998 
49 Pereboom, 2000, 2001, 2005, forthcoming 
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Bob inhabits a world where determinism is false, but where some events can still be 
deterministically caused.  At t1 Black initiates a deterministic process that will cause Bob 
to steal Ann’s car at t2 unless Bob freely chooses to steal the car at t2.  (Black doesn’t 
know, or care, that Bob can freely choose to steal the car at t2 in such a way that his free 
choice would supercede the deterministic process.)  Bob doesn’t know of Black or the 
deterministic process.  As it happens, Bob freely chooses on his own to steal the car at t2.  
Intuitively, Bob is morally responsible for choosing to steal the car at t2. 
 Mele and Robb’s case has several exciting improvements over Frankfurt’s original case – 
first Black doesn’t care whether Bob chooses on his own, rather he is only concerned with 
ensuring that Bob does what he wants him to.  In this sense, Black loses any overly theatrical 
interest he has in leaving Bob every opportunity to corrupt himself.  Second, the action is 
question is Bob’s choice to steal the car, not his actual stealing of the car.  If there’s anything we 
are truly morally responsible for, and not derivatively morally responsible for, it’s our choices.  
As such, this example sidesteps issues of whether Frankfurt cases gain their legitimacy by 
equivocating between moral responsibility and derivatively moral responsibility, completely 
ignoring both the result sense and external sense of alternate possibilities. 
 There remains the question of how, exactly, Black’s process works – and Mele and Robb 
offer their own account.  They ask us to imagine that Bob’s decision-making process mirrors that 
of a machine that works something like this:  Machine M is designed to create different colored 
widgets.  The colors of the widgets are determined by the color of the bb that hits a sensor when 
the machine is not currently in the process of making a widget.  Surrounding the machine are 
several bb guns that shoot different colored bbs towards the machine’s sensor.  If two or more 
bbs hit the sensor at the same time, the machine makes a widget based on the color of the right-
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most bb to hit the sensor.  No other bb that strikes the sensor at the same time factors into the 
color of the widget. 
Mele and Robb claim “Bob is analogous to M in an important respect. He is physically 
and psychologically so constituted that if an unconscious deterministic process in his brain and 
an indeterministic decision-making process of his were to “coincide” at the moment of decision, 
he would indeterministically decide on his own and the deterministic process would have no 
effect on his decision. This situation is an analogue of a case in which two bbs of the same color 
simultaneously hit M's receptor (while M is not busy making a widget)” (103-104).  Black’s 
deterministic process is akin to striking the sensor on the left-most side, while the result of Bob’s 
indeterministic decision-making process if he chooses to steal is akin to striking the sensor on the 
right-most side. 
 Thus, Mele and Robb contend that (1) Bob is uncontroversially morally responsible for 
choosing to steal the car, and (2) he had no alternate possibilities because there was no outcome 
in which he didn’t chose to steal the car, and he cannot choose not to steal the car because 
Black’s deterministic process would cause him to choose to steal the car if he wasn’t already 
going to do so. 
The problem with this case is that it is nothing more than a daunting version of the 
Second Smiths case.  As such, this case is merely a counterexample to AO, not AP.  There was 
nothing Bob could do to change the outcome – he could do nothing but choose to steal the car.  
But it still seems perfectly correct to say that Bob had alternate possibilities – he either freely 
chose to steal the car for his own reasons, or he was forced to steal the car by the device. 
3.3.1.5 Pereboom’s Frankfurt Case 
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 Derk Pereboom also believes that AP is false, but rather than attempt to come up with a 
case where the agent has no alternate possibilities, he believes it would be sufficient to come up 
with a case where the agent lacks robust alternate possibilities – a case where the agent can do 
otherwise, but where the agent would be equally morally responsible regardless of which 
possibility she chooses.  Pereboom’s case is as follows: 
The Tax Evasion Case 
Tax Evasion (2): Joe is considering claiming a tax deduction for the registration fee that 
he paid when he bought a house. He knows that claiming this deduction is illegal, but that 
he probably won't be caught, and that if he were, he could convincingly plead ignorance. 
Suppose he has a strong but not always overriding desire to advance his self-interest 
regardless of its cost to others and even if it involves illegal activity. In addition, the only 
way that in this situation he could fail to choose to evade taxes is for moral reasons, of 
which he is aware. He could not, for example, fail to choose to evade taxes for no reason 
or simply on a whim. Moreover, it is causally necessary for his failing to choose to evade 
taxes in this situation that he attain a certain level of attentiveness to moral reasons. Joe 
can secure this level of attentiveness voluntarily. However, his attaining this level of 
attentiveness is not causally sufficient for his failing to choose to evade taxes.  If he were 
to attain this level of attentiveness, he could, exercising his libertarian free will, either 
choose to evade taxes or refrain from so choosing (without the intervener's device in 
place). However, to ensure that he will choose to evade taxes, a neuroscientist has, 
unbeknownst to Joe, implanted a device in his brain, which, were it to sense the requisite 
level of attentiveness, would electronically stimulate the right neural centers so as to 
inevitably result in his making this choice. As it happens, Joe does not attain this level of 
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attentiveness to his moral reasons, and he chooses to evade taxes on his own, while the 
device remains idle (Pereboom, forthcoming, 9-10). 
Pereboom contends that (1) Joe is morally responsible for choosing to cheat on his taxes, 
and (2) although Joe can do otherwise, he can’t do otherwise in a way in which he would be 
differently morally responsible. 
There is, I think, something to be said for Pereboom’s focus on robust alternate 
possibilities.  He offers the following account of such robustness:  “For an alternative possibility 
to be relevant per se to explaining an agent’s moral responsibility for an action it must satisfy the 
following characterization: she could have willed something other than what she actually willed 
such that she understood that by willing it she would thereby have been precluded from the 
moral responsibility she actually has for the action” (Pereboom, 4).  Joe is said to lack robust 
alternate possibilities in this case because no matter how events unfold, he will be morally 
responsible to the same degree (for cheating). 
For Pereboom, Joe lacks robust alternate possibilities because even sans the 
neuroscientist’s device if Joe were to reach the requisite level of attentiveness then he still could 
have chosen to go through with his tax evasion, and had he done so Pereboom believes he would 
be as morally responsible as he is in the actual case where he never reached this attentiveness.  In 
other words, Pereboom contends that merely reaching the level of attentiveness is not a robust 
alternate possibility because alone it doesn’t mean than Joe’s moral responsibility would be any 
different. 
It’s not at all clear to me that Joe’s reaching an increases level of moral attentiveness 
would play no role in influencing Joe’s moral responsibility, but set this aside for the moment.  
Rather, focus on claim (1) – that Joe is morally responsible for his choice to cheat.  Pereboom 
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claims that Joe makes his choice at the end of the events described in the case, but if this is the 
case, then he is entirely causally determined to cheat by factors set up prior to the events of the 
case, and as such Pereboom begs the question about determinism.  Pereboom blatantly states that 
the only way he can avoid making such a choice is for moral reasons, and although under normal 
circumstances he may have the power to “overcome” these deterministic forces, the device in his 
brain makes it the case that he cannot. 
Based solely upon the events described in the case, in absence of any information about 
what happened before the case, we have no basis for holding Joe morally responsible for 
cheating.  He has no say in whether or not he will cheat given the device and the state of affairs 
at the beginning of the case.  In virtue of this, Pereboom can’t lay claim to having universal 
agreement on (1).   
We’re told that Joe chooses to evade his taxes, but this choice is entirely causally 
determined by circumstances in place before the events described in the case.  Joe’s choice, as 
described, is as much a choice as the thermostat makes when it turns on the heat given certain 
settings.  It is possible that Joe, prior to these events, freely acted in such a way that his being 
causally determined to cheat is something that he is derivatively morally responsible for (for 
example, perhaps Joe freely chose to become the sort of person who is predisposed to cheat), but 
we have no evidence of this.  If he did freely choose to act in this way, then is intuitively morally 
responsible for that choice, but we have no reason to think that Joe didn’t have alternate 
possibilities for that choice.  Thus, it seems that either (1) is false, or (2) is. 
Regardless Joe’s responsibility, or lack thereof, for his predisposition to cheat, the only 
control he has during the events described in the tax evasion case are over whether he reaches the 
level of attentiveness that under normal circumstances would allow him to reconsider whether he 
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would cheat or not.  Properly speaking, there is no choice to cheat that takes place in the 
example.  Rather, the only choice Joe can make during the timeframe described in this case is 
whether or not he will raise his level of moral awareness.  We’re supposed to believe that if he 
did this sort of thing sans device, it would allow him the opportunity to make a different choice – 
a choice about whether to cheat or not.   In a normal case, this would be the only way for him to 
interrupt the causal chain that was set up before the events of the case – necessary, but not 
sufficient, for him to choose not to cheat, sans Black’s device, of course.   
Note, though, that if Joe believed raising his moral attentiveness would be instrumental in 
him doing the right thing, either long term or short term, then it is prima facie true that Joe would 
be differently morally responsible if he raised his awareness than if he didn’t. 
Pereboom contends that reaching an increased level of attentiveness wouldn’t constitute a 
robust alternate possibility in virtue of the fact that simply by raising his level of attentiveness, 
he wouldn’t be differently morally responsible because he couldn’t be sure that he wouldn’t 
choose to cheat in the decision that (normally) followed from it.  In other words, Pereboom’s 
position is that Joe, sans device, doesn’t have robust alternate possibilities because he might still 
end up cheating, and thus his degree of moral responsibility would be the same. 
I think this is a mistake.  In the tax evasion case, Joe has control over one thing – raising 
his attentiveness.  But raising his attentiveness in this case is tantamount to trying to do the right 
thing, or, at least, trying to try to do the right thing. 
Pereboom’s case provides us a unique opportunity to look at the difference between an 
agent who (a) unreservedly cheats, and (b) tries not to cheat, but ends up cheating anyways.  In 
light of his predisposition to cheat, and the neuroscientist’s device, it is not possible for Joe not 
to cheat.  All he can do is take the steps that would normally be necessary for him to choose not 
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to cheat in a case like this.   Is an agent who unreservedly cheats morally equivalent to an agent 
who tries not to cheat, but ends up cheating anyways?  I think not; I think their moral records 
differ.  They may have the same entry for their cheating, but the latter does something the former 
doesn’t – try to do the right thing.  As long as Joe believes raising his attentiveness level may 
lead to him doing the right thing, then he is prima facie praiseworthy for doing so.50  So, too, is 
(b) prima facie more morally praiseworthy than (a), and Joe has robust alternate possibilities 
(just not alternate possibilities to cheating).  To illustrate this, consider the following case: 
The Makeup Test: 
Joey failed his math-test but has the chance to make it up this Saturday.  Joey believes 
that he can pass the test if he chooses to retake it, and believes that he should, morally 
speaking, pass the test if he can.  Joey has the option to retake the test on Saturday or stay 
at home.  He chooses to retake the test. 
It seems to me that just by choosing to retake the test Joey has done something that is 
prima facie morally praiseworthy.  We might, of course, wonder about whether Joey actually has 
the ability to pass the test, and what would happen to his original failing grade if he succeeds on 
his make-up test, but these are separate questions.  Joey’s showing up to class is a prerequisite 
for doing what he believes is right (passing the test he believes he can pass), and if he shows up 
for this reason, then he is praiseworthy in light of it.  Even if Joey fails because he, in fact, lacks 
the knowledge to pass the test, or worse, if his teacher secretly rigged the test to ensure he would 
fail regardless of how much he actually knew and tried, he is still praiseworthy for showing up. 
Similarly, it seems that Joe would be praiseworthy for reaching the requisite level of 
attentiveness.  To use Pereboom’s terminology, Joe could have willed something (reaching the 
                                                 
50 Joe is only praiseworthy for trying to do the right thing here.  If he is blameworthy for his predisposition to cheat, 
he is no less blameworthy in virtue of his doing something else praiseworthy.  However, it’s not at all clear that he is 
blameworthy for this. 
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requisite level of attentiveness) such that he understood by willing it he would thereby have been 
precluded from the moral blameworthiness he actually has for the action (not reaching this level 
of attentiveness).  The moral responsibility in question here is akin to Joey’s moral responsibility 
for “showing up to take the test”, not the moral responsibility for “failing the first test” or 
“failing the makeup test.”51 
The tax evasion case is especially bizarre.  Pereboom either begs the question about 
determinism, such that it is reasonable to believe (1) is false, or the choice he would hold Joe 
morally responsible for doesn’t occur during the events described in the case, such that we can’t 
say whether (2) is true or not.  The only thing Joe is in control of during the events in the 
example is whether he raises his moral attentiveness level – whatever this is.  In light of this, we 
can ask (1’) Is Joe morally responsible for failing to raise his attentiveness level, and (2’) did he 
lack robust alternate possibilities for this.  If Joe (falsely) believed that raising his attentiveness 
level might lead him to do the right thing (without risking further harm), then he is prima facie 
morally responsible for failing to raise his attentiveness level, and thus the answer to (1’) is 
“yes”.  However, raising his attentiveness level in such a case would be prima facie 
praiseworthy, and thus we have good reason to believe that the answer to (2’) is “no” – by 
raising his attentiveness level, he is differently morally responsible.  He is akin to Joey showing 
up to take the makeup test and failing because the teacher rigged the exam. 
3.4 Conclusion 
                                                 
51 It is, of course, not at all clear how one can be morally responsible for failing a test as long as, while taking the 
test, one acted responsibly.  One can, of course, be morally blameworthy for not studying for the exam ahead of 
time, for staying up late the night before the test, etc; but so long as one legitimately tries to pass the test, one cannot 
be blameworthy for failing to pass the test alone.  One can, of course, be derivatively morally blameworthy for 
passing the test insofar as one is blameworthy for not studying or for staying up late, but this is different.  That said, 
were one to goof off during the test, knowing this could lead to them failing the test, one can be blameworthy for 
this. 
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 According to the control principle, moral agents cannot be morally responsible for 
something outside of their control, something that is a matter of luck.  However, the exact nature 
of the control required by this principle is rather intractable; in contrast, the nature of alternate 
possibilities is decidedly less so when conceived as a surrogate for the control principle.  The 
principle of alternate possibilities enjoys a similar intuitive appeal to the control principle despite 
merely specifying a necessary, but not sufficient condition for moral responsibility. 
 Frankfurt’s attack on the principle has taken on an almost mythic quality, however the 
Black case shouldn’t be taken as evidence that Frankfurt has succeeded in his goal of proving AP 
false; if anything he has merely demonstrated the falsity of AO, a principle that is inconsistent 
with CP.  In contrast, the principle of alternate possibilities, when conceived of as a surrogate for 
CP, provides us with robust, necessary conditions for moral responsibility – commonsense 
conditions that are at least prima facie consistent with libertarianism. 
 In the next chapter I will argue that libertarianism is maximally consistent with both CP 
and AP.  Following that, I argue that the kind of control libertarianism requires for moral 
responsibility is both coherent and consistent with our best scientific theories. 
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Chapter 4:  What Moral Responsibility Requires 
4.1 Introduction 
I contend that a version of libertarianism that is consistent with the moral principles I 
have discussed throughout this dissertation is maximally consistent with our commonsense moral 
intuitions and beliefs.  I have shown that it is maximally consistent with both the control 
principle and principle of alternate possibilities.  In the previous two chapters I have defended 
these principles against prima facie counterexamples, cases of moral luck and Frankfurt-style 
cases respectively. 
In this chapter, however, I will discuss perhaps the most troubling argument against 
libertarianism – the case against incompatibilism.  Incompatibilism is the theory that moral 
responsibility and universal causal determinism are mutually exclusive; that moral agents are not 
morally responsible for what they have been completely causally determined to do.  
Libertarianism is an incompatibilist52 theory of moral responsibility, and thus according to the 
libertarian, moral responsibility is incompatible with universal causal determinism.53 
In this chapter I offer a defense of libertarian incompatibilist theories from three popular 
arguments against incompatibilist theories of moral responsibility:  (1) what Peter Van Inwagen 
                                                 
52 Incompatibilists can be separated into two camps – (1) those who believe no one is actually morally responsible 
for anything, and (2) – libertarians – those who believe moral responsibility is possible and thus universal 
determinism is false.  In (1) there is a further division –  (a) hard determinists, who believe that (i) moral 
responsibility is incompatible with determinism, (ii) determinism is true, and thus (iii) contingently no one is ever 
morally responsible; and (b) hard incompatibilists, who believe that (i) moral responsibility is incompatible with 
either determinism or indeterminism, (ii) either determinism or indeterminism is true, and thus (iii) moral 
responsibility is impossible.  The difference between (1)(a) and (1)(b) is that hard determinists believe it is only 
contingently true that no one is morally responsible, while hard incompatibilists believe that moral responsibility is 
impossible, and thus it is necessarily true that no one is morally responsible. 
53 Most incompatibilists believe that if an agent’s actions are completely causally necessitated by events outside of 
their control, then their actions are not free and they cannot be morally responsible for them.  However, some 
incompatibilists contend that an agent can be morally responsible for causally determined actions as long as at some 
point in the past, there was indeterminism involved (See Ekstrom 2000, 2003; Mele 1995, 1996, 2006; and Kane 
1996b).  Theories of this latter kind are inconsistent with the control principle as they open moral responsibility up 
to luck; rather at best it makes sense to say that agents are derivatively morally responsible for such causally 
determined actions, and are actually morally responsible for their earlier indeterministic actions.  
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calls the Mind argument54; (2) the reason-responsiveness argument, and (3) David Hume’s 
endurance argument.  Each of these theories asserts that incompatibilist theories of moral 
responsibility are inconsistent with a different commonsense moral principle – the control 
principle, the non-arbitrary principle, and what I call the endurance principle.  I will show 
otherwise.  I argue that any prima facie inconsistency between libertarianism and these principles 
is a byproduct of one of the ways in which we describe causation, in event-terms.  Theories of 
event-causation maintain that the best way in which to understand causation is in terms of 
events, where events completely causally necessitate other events to occur, where events consist 
of objects, or substances, acting, or being changed, over time.  The event-causal theorist 
maintains that only events cause actions, and thus, although agents may participate in events, 
they are never the causes of their own actions. 
There is a plausible alternative to these event-causal theories; theories of substance-
causation maintain that substances, not events, cause events, where, again, events consist in the 
substances being changed over time.  Theories of agent-causation assert that agent-substances 
can be a special kind of cause, where agents, such as moral agents, are said to be the authors, or 
first causes, of their actions.  According to agent-causal theories consistent with libertarianism, 
events, actions, or other substances may influence agent-causes, but do not necessarily determine 
the agent to act in one way or another.  If agent-causation is possible, then agents can be the sort 
of non-arbitrary, yet undetermined, causes of their own actions necessary for libertarian moral 
responsibility. 
                                                 
54 Van Inwagen explains “The name ‘The Mind Argument’ is due to the fact that between 1930 and 1960, versions 
of the argument appeared regularly in that philosophical journal. One example is R. E. Hobart’s classic essay, “Free 
Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable without It” (Hobart 1934).  Variants of the Mind argument are 
sometimes called arguments from luck.  The thrust of the version discussed here is that anything that arises from an 
indeterministic process is a matter of chance, and no one has control over what is a matter of chance.  Authors who 
have made such an argument include Almeida and Bernstein 2003, Ekstrom 2000, Haji 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b, 
2000c, and 2001, Mele 1998, 1999a, 1999b, and 2005, and Galen Strawson 1994. 
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Below I will show that the three common arguments against libertarian theories of moral 
responsibility fail if we understand the world in terms of substance-causation, rather than event-
causation.  Following this, I offer a defense of agent-causation against five of its most common 
criticisms.  I contend that we have good reason to think that agent-causation, or something like it, 
offers a plausible theory of causation.  Furthermore, to the extent that we believe moral 
responsibility is possible at the actual world, we have good reason to think that agent-causation, 
or something very much like it, exists in the actual world. 
4.2 Three Objections to Incompatibilist theories of Moral Responsibility 
In the following sections I discuss three arguments against libertarian incompatibilism.  
The first argument, the Mind argument, is the argument that the control required by the control 
principle is incompatible with an undetermined agent.  The second argument, the reason-
responsiveness argument, asserts that an undetermined agent’s actions are necessarily random or 
arbitrary, and thus are incompatible with the non-arbitrary principle.  Although similar, these two 
arguments assert radically different things – the first that libertarian agents have no control, the 
second that their actions are inherently arbitrary, regardless of questions of control.  After 
discussing these two arguments, I turn to Carl Ginet’s responses to these arguments.  He offers a 
commonsense interpretation of the problem, but fails to offer a robust solution to the underlying 
metaphysical problems these objections raise.  However, I contend that the metaphysics required 
by agent-causation makes Ginet’s account more plausible. 
The third argument I discuss is David Hume’s endurance argument against libertarian 
theories of moral responsibility.  Hume contends that it wouldn’t make sense to hold agents 
morally responsible for actions if the cause of their action is fleeting, and that the cause of an 
undetermined agent’s actions are always fleeting – that is to say that nothing of the cause endures 
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in the agent to make her morally blameworthy or praiseworthy for what she caused.  I will show 
that Hume’s compatibilist account of moral responsibility fares little better than what he says 
about libertarianism, and that the libertarian can offer a better response than he envisions. 
4.2.1 The Mind Argument 
“The Mind argument” is the name Peter Van Inwagen gives to a series of arguments 
against libertarianism that take the following form:  (I) If an agent’s choice, decision, or action is 
not completely causally determined by the laws of nature and antecedent circumstances, then it is 
determined at random, arbitrarily, or by chance.  (II) If it’s determined arbitrarily et al., the agent 
lacks control over what she does.  Thus, (III) the agent isn’t morally responsible for what she’s 
done.  The thrust of this argument is that no choice, decision, or action can be free unless it is 
completely nomically necessitated by antecedent events, where something is nomically 
necessitated by antecedent events if and only if the antecedent events, coupled with the laws of 
nature, completely causally determine that something.55  Van Inwagen summarizes the argument 
like this:  “If what one does does not follow deterministically from one’s previous states, then it 
is the result of an indeterministic process, and (necessarily) one is unable to determine the 
outcome of an indeterministic process” (2008, 15-16).  The argument is that undetermined agents 
have no say in what they do, no control over their choices, and thus the idea that such agents can 
be morally responsible is inconsistent with the control principle. 
Carl Ginet offers a response to these kinds of arguments, attempting to show that agents 
whose actions are undetermined are still in control.  Ginet characterizes the argument as follows: 
                                                 
55 Ginet uses this terminology in his 1989 article “Reasons Explanations of Action: An Incompatibilist Account.”   
The term is instrumentally valuable because it captures the kind of causation typical in a purely deterministic world.  
Libertarians contend that an agent’s actions can be causally determined by the agent without being nomically 
necessitated 
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(1) For any time t and any undetermined event occurring at t: It is not possible for 
it to have been in anyone’s power to determine whether the event or some 
alternative (undetermined) event instead would occur at t. 
(2) Therefore, for any time t and undetermined action occurring at t:  It is not 
possible for it to have been in the agent’s power to determine whether that action or 
some alternative (undetermined) action instead would occur at t. 
(3) Therefore, it is not possible for a free action to be undetermined. (Ginet, 1989, 
19-20, my italics) 
Ginet admits this argument is valid, but disputes its premises, claiming whatever prima facie 
plausibility these premises have is derived from an ambiguity in sentences like this: 
(A)  It was in S’s power to determine whether undetermined event E or some 
alternative undetermined event would occur at t (20). 
Ginet claims the ambiguity of (A) depends on ownership of the event in question.  When E is not 
S’s action, he contends the natural reading of (A) would be an impossible position – it would 
require that E be both determined and undetermined, but that there is another reading of (A), one 
that is coherent, which is as follows: 
(A2)  It was in S’s power to act in a certain way at t without being nomically 
necessitated to do so; and it was in S’s power to act in some alternative way at t 
without being nomically necessitated to do so (21, my italics). 
Here, Ginet contends, because we assume E belongs to S (because it is S’s action), it makes 
perfect sense to say that it was in S’s power to perform an undetermined event.  He says, “Here 
each conjunct attributes to S the power to make the case something that in itself is perfectly 
possible, namely, S’s performing an undetermined action.  If an undetermined action is possible 
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then there is no reason to say that an undetermined action cannot be in the agent’s power to 
perform” (21).  Ginet continues, “To determine an event is to act in such a way that one’s action 
makes it the case that the event occurs.” 
Ginet’s response to the problem turns on the notion of action-ownership, and in doing so 
begs the question.  Althought it is prima facie plausible to say that agents own their actions 
because they are up to them, the thrust of the Mind argument is that an agent’s undetermined 
actions aren’t up to them – they’re an arbitrary byproduct of the random indeterministic event 
that caused them.  It is, of course, theoretically possible that the indeterministic event that caused 
the agent to chose one way over the other is located within the agent herself – for example, some 
suggest that it might be the result of some undetermined quantum event located inside the brain – 
but this doesn’t make the choice any more up to the agent than had an external quantum event 
caused her to act in the same way.  In virtue of the fact that the choices of undetermined agents 
are outside of their control, it wouldn’t make sense to say that they own their actions.  This is to 
say that according to the Mind argument, undetermined agents lack ownership of their actions 
because their actions are outside of their control. 
Ginet’s response rests upon the assumption that moral agents have it within their power 
to act, and what it is to have the power to act is to control the act itself – to own it. However, to 
adequately defend incompatibilism from the Mind argument, one must show that an agent’s non-
nomically necessitated actions are up to them, not the byproduct of some undetermined, 
inherently arbitrary event outside of their control.  In 4.3 below, I argue a theory of agent-
causation will allow us to do just this. 
4.2.2 The Reason-Responsiveness Argument 
 76
Libertarian theories are also often criticized for not being able to account for the role that 
reasons, desires, and the like play in our decision making processes.  A. J. Ayer makes the 
following argument: 
Either it is an accident that I choose to act as I do or it is not.  If it is an accident, then it is 
merely a matter of chance that I did not choose otherwise; and if it is merely a matter of 
chance that I did not choose otherwise, it is surely irrational to hold me morally 
responsible for choosing as I did.  But if it is not an accident that I choose to do one thing 
rather than another, then presumably there is some causal explanation of my choice: and 
in that case we are led back to determinism (1959, 275). 
Similarly, J.J.C. Smart contends that “a close approximation to determinism on the macro-level 
is required for free will” and, thus, moral responsibility (1968, 300-301) – for Smart, to act freely 
is to act in accordance with reasons.  The idea that agents act both from reasons and 
indeterministically, Smart claims, is unintelligible.  John Stuart Mill, too, contends that volitions 
follow from “moral antecedents”, much as physical effects follow from physical causes.  “A 
volition is a moral effect, which follows the corresponding moral causes as certainly and 
invariably as physical effects follow their physical causes” (1872, 451-452).  He contends that 
desires, habits, and dispositions, combined with contingent external circumstances, nomically 
necessitate persons to act.   
Ginet argues the opposite – that moral agents can act for reasons without being caused to 
act by those reasons.  To demonstrate this, he asks us to imagine an agent has reasons for doing 
two mutually exclusive things.  In his example, Ginet has to choose how to spend his Saturday 
afternoons – watching football, or doing philosophical work.  He claims that he wants to do both 
but can’t do both, and asks, “Can’t I choose to satisfy one of the motives on some of these 
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occasions and the other on others of them, without there being a relevant difference in the 
antecedents on these several occasions?” (1989, 26) 
Mill’s answer would be no, he can’t.  For Mill in cases of conflicting motives, we do 
whatever we have the best reasons to do.  Ginet is skeptical, and turns to Thomas Reid – Reid 
claimed that we cannot know whether the will is motivated by the strongest will in such cases 
unless we know what the strongest will is.56   Either the “strongest motive” means the one that 
won out, and thus is true by definition, or it is determined by some independent criteria.  But the 
only charitable account of Mill’s is the latter – Mill proposes just such a criteria, in typical 
utilitarian fashion, as meaning “the motive which is strongest in relation to pain and pleasure,” 
but claims that even if this criterion is not correct, what matters is the repeatability of one’s 
motives, such that if in a given instance an agent has two conflicting motives, A and B, and the 
agent was motivated by A, in the next instance where the agent was motivated by both A and B, 
A would again win out (1872, 468-469). 
At first glance, this is prima facie inconsistent with our intuitions about Ginet’s Saturday 
afternoons – surely he could choose to watch the game one Saturday, and do what really matters 
(philosophy) the next.  But on closer examination, we have good reason to think that Ginet might 
weigh his reasons differently between the two days – perhaps, on the second Saturday, his 
deadline approaching and a boring game on, he chooses to do philosophy.  This is to say that it is 
prima facie plausible that his motivations may differ between one Saturday and the next.  
However, assume – as Ginet does – that his reasons are the same both Saturdays, and yet he 
chooses football the first, philosophy the second.  This alone wouldn’t be enough to show that 
the strongest motivation doesn’t win out – it is possible that Ginet’s motives for watching 
football are exactly the same strength as his motives for doing philosophy.  If so, he may be akin 
                                                 
56 Ginet, 1989, discusses a passage from Reid’s 1815 work, quoted from Dworkin ed. (1970) 88-89, 
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to Buridan’s ass – caught between two equally motivating choices.  To avoid starving – or 
simply standing there dumbfounded until one of his motives goes away (say the game ends), 
moral and non-moral agents alike need some way to break the tie.  Surely Mill would be open to 
some arbitrary – perhaps even indeterministic – tiebreakers in such cases.  However the 
existence of indeterministic tie-breakers alone wouldn’t be sufficient to satisfy the 
incompatibilist.   
Our intuitions seem to mirror Ginet’s contention – that moral agents often have the ability 
to, and actually do, choose to act from two or more dissimilar sets of reasons, and they can do so 
independent of how they actually rate them, whether morally, practically, or by some other scale.  
For example, we believe moral agents can, and often do, do the wrong thing knowing it’s 
morally wrong. 
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of Ginet’s example is that it bears a striking 
similarity to an example proposed by Peter Van Inwagen (2000) as an argument against 
incompatibilism.  Van Inwagen contends that one, flawed, response to the Mind argument (and 
one that applies equally to the reason-responsiveness argument) is that terms like “chance” and 
“random” are best understood in terms of a sequence of events, and thus are not appropriate for 
individual instances of agent action explanation. 
To demonstrate the futility of this argument, he first asks us to imagine that undetermined 
free acts occur.  At t1 Alice is put in a difficult position and has to choose between lying and 
telling the truth.  Alice considers both and at t2 freely chooses to tell the truth.  Next, he asks us 
to assume that free will is incompatible with determinism, and thus Alice’s choice is 
undetermined.  Suppose, he says, that the moment Alice finishes telling the truth, God rewinds 
the universe back to t1, and then lets things go forward again.  How, he asks, might things turn 
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out the second time?  Because Alice’s choice was undetermined, she can either lie or tell the 
truth.  Her telling the truth the first time around has no bearing on what she would do the second 
time around.  Next, he asks us to consider what would happen if God made Alice choose in this 
way a thousand times.  Although we can’t say what would have happened, Van Inwagen thinks 
we can say what “probably would have happened:  sometimes Alice would have lied and 
sometimes she would have told the truth.” He asks us to imagine we are watching each 
successive replay, and asks “Is it not true that as we watch the number of replays increase, we 
shall become convinced that what will happen in the next replay is a matter of chance?” (2000, 
14-15). 
What is striking about Van Inwagen’s case is that it seems to be an idealized variation of 
Ginet’s Saturday afternoon case.  In Van Inwagen’s case, we’re supposed to come to the 
conclusion that Alice lied sometimes and told the truth other times, however she had exactly the 
same reasons to do either.  Suppose we even stipulated that although Alice had reasons to lie and 
reasons to tell the truth, that one of these sets of reasons was substantially greater than the other.  
For the libertarian, it must still be possible for Alice to do either, and thus Van Inwagen would 
contend, that in some run-throughs she would lie, and in some she would tell the truth, and since 
by stipulation there is no change in her reasons, and her reasons favor one choice rather than the 
other, the fact that we believe she would in some run-throughs tell the truth, and in others lie, is 
evidence that her choices are arbitrary.  This is to say that although, after the fact, we can point to 
a set of reasons she had for doing what she did, her actual choice to lie or tell the truth has 
nothing to do with these sets of reasons – on some run-throughs, we believe she would lie, and 
on others, tell the truth, and how she chose between acting on one set of reasons or the other is a 
matter of chance. 
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Van Inwagen’s case makes the implications of Ginet’s response all the more damaging – 
in Van Inwagen’s case, we might take the position that (1) Alice always chooses to tell the truth 
in each run-through, but that (2) nothing about the set of circumstances nomically necessitate 
Alice to tell the truth.  But Ginet’s Saturday afternoon case seems to commit him, and perhaps 
the rest of us, to the opposite conclusion – that we believe we not only can, but do often act 
arbitrarily.57 
It seems as if the libertarian has two possible replies – first, she can bite the bullet and 
accept that agents can be morally responsible for these actions, even though they are ultimately 
arbitrary.  For Ginet, it’s apparently sufficient that an agent’s undetermined act simply appears 
as if the agent was the cause.58  This would mean accepting that libertarianism is incompatible 
with the non-arbitrary principle, as well as the majority of our commonsense moral beliefs. 
Second, the libertarian can contend that agents can act for reasons, but not be causally 
determined by them.  I believe this reply is maximally consistent with our commonsense 
intuitions and beliefs, most notably it is consistent with our intuition that moral agents can, and 
often do, do irrational things.  Ginet might very well put off doing philosophy to watch the game 
                                                 
57 I believe there is an ambiguity in Ginet’s case – on the one hand, we’re inclined to believe that Ginet can choose 
to watch the game one Saturday and do philosophy the next despite having, all things being equal, the same reasons 
on one Saturday as the next.  However, unless we postulate that Ginet bangs his head and forgets the previous 
Saturday, and the entire week, and remains clueless to the passage of time, the fact of the matter is that things 
change between the first and second Saturdays in a way in which they do not change in Van Inwagen’s Alice case.  
Thus, if we’re inclined to believe that Alice may consistently choose to tell the truth, but not be nomically 
necessitated to, we can also side with Ginet’s case and say that he can do one thing one Saturday, and the other the 
next because circumstances change.  But if this is our interpretation of Ginet’s case, it is no longer a counterexample 
to Mill’s theory that we can, in fact, act according to our strongest reasons. 
58 Randolph Clarke in “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will,” an entry to the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, says the following of Ginet’s view:  “On Ginet's view, each basic action is 
characterized by an actish phenomenal quality, its seeming to the agent as if she is directly making happen the event 
that is her basic action. Ginet stresses the "as if" nature of this appearance; it does not, he says, literally represent to 
the agent that she is causing the event in question. And in fact, he holds, it cannot be true that we really are agent-
causes of what we do, and it need be the case that any events involving us cause our actions.”  Although Ginet 
claims agent-causation is impossible, and that event-causation is the only sort of causation that is possible for moral 
agents, Ginet’s view counts as a noncausal theorist’s view in light of the fact that he offers no substinative account 
of the conditions under which an action has these apparently morally decicisive qualities. 
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despite the fact that, objectively, doing philosophy may be both the morally right thing and the 
all-things-considered practical thing.  For this, he would be morally blameworthy in virtue of the 
fact that he knows the right thing to do (philosophy), knows that it is the right thing, and still 
chooses to act otherwise for a lesser reason (his desire to watch football).   
Similarly it is prima facie plausible to say that moral agents have the ability to act 
arbitrarily – this is to say that Alice might very well make her choice to lie or tell the truth 
arbitrarily, and if this is how she chooses to make her choice, then we shouldn’t be surprised if in 
some run-throughs, she lies, and in others she tells the truth.  However, when she chooses at 
random, she does not choose for any reasons. 
For the libertarian, to be morally responsible for some action is to own that action – to 
have that action be up to the agent herself.  If agents were nomically necessitated to act 
according to their strongest reason (regardless of whether their strongest reason is objectively 
rational), there is no way in which the agent’s action belongs to the agent.  Intuitively, moral 
responsibility requires that the agent have the ability to act both rationally, for reasons, and 
irrationally, against reason.  Only then can it be up to the agent whether she acts rationally or 
not, whether she freely chooses to do good or wrong, and thus whether or not she is morally 
praiseworthy or blameworthy. 
4.2.3 The Endurance Argument 
The third argument I will discuss against libertarian theories of moral responsibility is 
David Hume’s endurance argument.  In A Treatise on Human Nature, Hume argues that the 
libertarian position is founded upon three misconceptions.  First, that agents often experience a 
false sensation of the ability to do otherwise.  Necessity implies the use of force, he contends, 
and because agents feel no force, they mistakenly believe that they could have done otherwise, 
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despite the fact that they are causally determined to act by their own desires.59  Second, there is a 
“false sensation of experience” of liberty that many libertarians “regard as an argument for its 
real existence.”60  But these assertions merely beg the question.  Third, Hume contends that 
religion unnecessarily biases us towards libertarianism.  His attempted refutation of this 
“misconception” leads us to what I call the endurance argument against libertarianism. 
Hume contends the libertarian position is generally better received than the necessitarian 
position – the position that moral responsibility requires determinism – because religion has 
taken a bizarre interest in the matter.61  Regardless, he claims, the role that moral praise and 
blame play in society is clear.  Hume claims “’Tis indeed certain, that as all human laws are 
founded on rewards and punishments, ‘tis suppos’d as a fundamental principle, that these 
motives have an influence on the mind and both produce the good and prevent the evil 
actions.”62  He contends that the concepts of reward and punishment found in religion, moral 
discourse, and the law all presuppose determinism. 
This reasoning is equally solid, when apply’d to divine laws, so far as the deity is 
consider’d as a legislator, and is suppos’d to inflict punishment and bestow rewards with 
a design to produce obedience.  But I also maintain, that even where he acts not in his 
magisterial capacity, but is regarded as the avenger of crimes merely on account of their 
odiousness and deformity, not only ‘tis impossible, without necessary connexion of cause 
and effect in human actions, that punishments cou’d be inflicted compatible with justice 
and moral equity; but also that it cou’d enter into the thoughts of any reasonable being to 
inflict them.  The constant and universal object of hatred or anger is a person or creature 
                                                 
59 David Hume A Treatise on Human Nature 2.3.2.1. 
60 David Hume A Treatise on Human Nature 2.3.2.2. 
61 David Hume A Treatise on Human Nature 2.3.2.3-4. 
62 David Hume A Treatise on Human Nature 2.3.2.5. 
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endow’d with thought and consciousness; and when any criminal or injurious actions 
excite this passion, ‘tis only by their relation to the person or connexion with him.63 
Here, Hume asserts (1) given that punishment and reward are designed to produce obedience, it 
would be unreasonable to engage in praise or blame unless we believe they would reliably do so, 
and (2) that it only makes sense to praise or blame an agent who has some enduring connection 
to her good or bad actions.  Libertarians, I think, have good reason to reject (1) – surely it would 
be sufficient to praise and blame agents if doing so merely made it more likely they would act as 
you desire.  Furthermore, we often imprison or kill morally blameworthy agents, which tends to 
reduce their opportunities to repeat offend regardless of whether they are libertarian agents.  
However, (2) has far more bite – surely there must be something of the agent that endures such 
that it makes sense to hold them morally responsible for their actions – but the libertarian’s free 
choices are fleeting, as their actions can be traced back to a bout of indeterminism, Hume says, 
not the enduring character traits or desires that necessitarians believe causally determine one’s 
actions.  Hume says: 
Actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not 
from some cause in the characters and disposition of the person, who perform’d them, 
they infix not themselves upon him, and can neither redound to his honour, if good, nor 
infamy, if evil.  The action itself maybe blameable; it may be contrary to all the rules of 
morality and religion:  But the person is not responsible for it; and as it proceeded from 
nothing in him, that is durable or constant, and leaves nothing of that nature behind it, ‘tis 
impossible he can, upon its account, become the object of punishment or vengeance.  
                                                 
63 David Hume A Treatise on Human Nature 2.3.2.6. 
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According to the hypothesis of liberty; therefore, a man is as pure and untainted, after 
having committed the most horrible crimes, as at the first moment of his birth…64 
Hume’s argument is that holding agents blameworthy or praiseworthy wouldn’t make sense if 
their choices were made indeterministically because there is no enduring character trait to 
encourage or discourage.  In light of the prima facie plausibility of Hume’s argument, the 
following principle seems to capture our moral intuitions: 
The Endurance Principle:  For an agent to be the appropriate object of moral praise and 
blame for some action A, there must be some enduring feature that persists in the agent that 
played a causal role in bringing about A. 
For Hume, what endures is one’s character traits.  It makes sense to blame and punish 
moral agents because in most cases, those agents have character traits that would, given a similar 
set of circumstances, cause them to act in a similar undesirable manner.  So far, so good – the 
problem with his view is that once an agent successfully abandons her bad character traits, or at 
the point when it is impossible (or highly unlikely) that external circumstances coupled with 
those bad character traits will cause the agent to act in an undesirable manner, for Hume it no 
longer makes sense to hold the agent morally blameworthy.  This is to say that, for Hume, 
reformed agents are no longer morally responsible for what they’ve done in the past because 
they no longer have the character traits in question. 
On Hume’s view, the moment that someone’s character changes, she is no longer, 
properly speaking, morally responsible for her actions caused by her now lost character 
regardless of how this change in character arises.  Furthermore, on Hume’s view, should the 
world be changed in such a way to make someone’s character less problematic, again she is no 
                                                 
64 David Hume A Treatise on Human Nature 2.3.2.6. 
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longer morally responsible for what her character, coupled with how the world was, caused her 
to do because she won’t be caused to act in the same way again. 
On Hume’s theory the murderer who immediately recants is entirely morally blameless, 
the drug dealer who “just wanted to do it once” is entirely morally blameless, and the thief who 
succeeds in stealing the one and only item she wanted to steal is entirely morally blameless.  This 
is because no amount of punishment will make these agents less likely to repeat offend than they 
already are.  Hume would object to cases like the these, contending that the character traits that 
caused them to act wrongly are still a sufficient threat to hold such agents morally responsible.  
However, this is an empirical matter, and it is at least prima facie plausible that prompts such as 
getting caught coupled with the threat of punishment alone might be sufficient to change one’s 
character, and it is at least prima facie plausible that an agent’s actions can change the world in 
such a way that their character is no longer going to cause problems of a similar nature. 
Although the endurance principle is prima facie consistent with our intuitions about 
moral responsibility, its implications for the necessitarian are very counterintuitive.  Of course, 
the necessitarian compatibilist would be quick to point out that the libertarian’s theory has far 
greater unintuitive aspects – at least, according to Hume, moral agents can be morally 
responsible for their actions for the time they retain their (mutable) character traits.  Hume 
believes that it wouldn’t make sense to hold a libertarian-moral agent morally responsible 
because the cause of her actions would be a momentary bout of indeterminism.  However, the 
libertarian maintains that the agent herself is the cause of her actions, and there can be no doubt 
that such an agent is at least as permanent as her character traits.65 
4.3 Agent-Causation 
                                                 
65 The only exception to this would be in transitory agents.  For example, suppose that there was some hardwired 
character trait shared by a human being with multiple personality disorder.  If it makes sense to say that each of 
these personalities is a distinct person, then character traits may outlive persons in this bizarre case. 
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Hume defines causation in two ways – first, the constant conjunction of two objects, and 
second, the inference of the mind from one to the other.66  Neither offers any robust metaphysical 
explanation of causation, nor captures our commonsense intuitions about causation.  Over time, 
philosophers have settled on two relatively robust metaphysical theories of causation – The first, 
event-causation, claims that events cause other events, where events are complex entities 
typically said to be comprised of objects, or substances, over time.  Moral philosophers who 
appeal to event-causation to explain an agent’s actions have trouble showing how the agent who 
participates in said events has the control required by the control principle.  For event-causal 
compatibilists, agents play the same kind of role as other substances in the event, and thus it 
makes little sense to say that the agent was in any more control of her actions than the laws of 
physics, the air surrounding her, etc.  In contrast, according to event-causal libertarians, agents 
might play even less of a role in what they do, as an agent’s choices aren’t determined by the 
agent herself, but rather by indeterministic mental events that cause her choice. 
According to the second account of causation, substance-causation, substances, not 
events, are causes.  Agent-causation is a special kind of substance-causation according to which 
agents are special kinds of substances that can have non-arbitrary control over what they do.  For 
agent-causal theorists, agents are causa sui, or self causes.  Unlike the agents posited by event-
causal theorists, what the agent-causal agents do is, in no uncertain terms, up to them insofar as 
they, and they alone, cause their actions, and their choices are not nomically necessitated by 
antecedent circumstances or undetermined events.67 
                                                 
66 David Hume A Treatise on Human Nature 2.3.2.4. 
67 Some Philosophers who have held agent-causal views include George Berkeley (1710), Roderick Chisholm 
(1966, 1971, 1976a, 1976b, and 1978), Randolph Clarke (1993 and 1996), Alan Donagan (1987), Meghan Griffith 
(2005 and 2007), Timothy O'Connor (1995, 1996, 2000a, 2000b, 2002, and 2005), Thomas Reid (1788), William 
Rowe (1991, 2000, 2003, and 2006), Richard Taylor (1966 and 1992), Francisco Suárez, John Thorp (1980), and 
Michael Zimmerman (1984).  Hard incompatibilist Derk Pereboom (2001, 2004, 2005, 2007, forthcoming, 
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What distinguishes an agent-cause from other substance-causes is that agent-causes are 
stipulated to be complex, reason-responsive substances that, although not caused by reasons, are 
capable of acting in accordance, or in defiance, of reason.  In virtue of this fact, if agent-
causation is possible, agent-causal libertarian theories have a response to the reason-
responsiveness argument.  In virtue of this special attribute of agent-causes, agent-causal 
libertarians have the tools they need to answer the challenges of the Mind argument – what an 
agent does, according to the agent-causal theorist, is uncontroversially up to the agent, and not 
any external fleeting moment of indeterminism, and because the agent-cause is capable of acting 
for reasons, the agent-cause’s actions can be non-arbitrary.  (Of course, an agent-cause may also 
choose to act in an arbitrary manner, but having the capacity to act arbitrarily is different from 
necessarily acting arbitrarily.  Thus an agent who acts arbitrarily can be blamed for acting in this 
manner because she could have done otherwise.)  Thirdly, because agent-causes persist over 
time, it makes perfect sense to say that they are enduring substances of the kind our intuitions 
behind the endurance principle requires.  
4.3.1 Five Arguments against Agent-causation 
An agent-causal libertarian theory of moral responsibility is prima facie maximally 
compatible with the control principle, principle of alternate possibilities, non-arbitrary principle, 
and endurance principle.  However, there has been substantial pushback against the theory.  In 
the following sections I will discuss five grounds on which theories of agent-causation are often 
challenged.  First, some contend that agent-causation is needlessly ontologically complex.  
Second, I discuss a version of the reason-responsiveness argument similarly aimed at agent-
causal libertarians.  Third, I discuss a version of the Mind argument levied specifically against 
                                                                                                                                                             
forthcoming 2) contends that agent-causation is required for free will, but that there is sufficient evidence against 
agent-causation to conclude that we lack free will. 
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agent-causal libertarians.  Fourth, some argue the concept of an indeterministic, but non-arbitrary 
cause is unintelligible.  Fifth, some claim that the science evidence shows that we are 
contingently not agent-causes. 
4.3.1.1 The Ontological Complexity Argument 
One objection to agent-causal theories is that they require a needlessly complex 
ontological commitment – belief in both (non-agent) substance-causation and the robust agent-
substance-causation necessary for libertarian moral responsibility.  This ontological complexity 
argument rests upon Occam’s razor – the theory that one ought not postulate metaphysical 
entities beyond those that are necessary to do the job.   Roughly, this is the theory that all thing 
being equal, if two distinct sets of ontological commitments have the same philosophical 
benefits, the more parsimonious is assumed to be true.  A variant of the Occam’s razor asserts 
that increased ontological commitments are only acceptable when accompanied by substantive 
additional explanatory value.  Critics contend either (1) the explanatory power of agent-causal 
theories can be had with a less burdensome ontological commitment, or (2) the additional 
explanatory power of agent-causal theories is not worth the substantially more burdensome 
ontological commitment given the alternatives. 
While it is possible that another theory may have the same explanatory value as agent-
causation, critics who allege (1) tend to point to theories of event-causation – specifically either 
event-causal deterministic compatibilist theories or event-causal indeterministic incompatibilist 
theories.  In this chapter, we’ve seen how the latter is incapable of matching up with our 
intuitions about the control, non-arbitrary, and endurance principles; but event-causal 
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compatibilist theories fail for the same reasons68.  In virtue of this, the rest of this section will 
focus on arguments of type (2).   
To determine whether or not agent-causal libertarian theories are worth the additional 
ontological commitment, there are two questions we must answer: (a) what is the burdensome 
ontological commitment associated with agent-causation, and (b) is it worth it?   
First, some claim agent-causal theories employ what Robert Kane calls “extra factor”69 
strategies; all Kane means by this is that some agent-causal theories are best understood as 
multiple-causal theories, where substance-causation alone is insufficient to explain causation in 
all cases, and event-causation is needed to fill in the gaps.  Some proponents of multiple-causal 
theories appeal to mind/body dualism, contending that the mind is not subject to normal physical 
laws, and here is where agent-substance-causation comes in.  Kant contended that free will 
couldn’t be explained in scientific, physical, or psychological terms, and famously posited a 
“noumenal self” that is outside of both space and time that can’t be explained in this way.  
Recently, Sir John Eccles has appealed to what he calls a “transempirical power center” that may 
account for libertarian free will.70  Eccles contends that free will requires indeterminism in the 
brain.  However this indeterminism isn’t sufficient for free will, rather this indeterminacy creates 
“gaps in nature” that “make room for free will.”71  These gaps are where he claims a 
transempirical power center can intervene in the physical world, causing the brain to choose one 
option over another. 
                                                 
68 Event-causal determinist compatibilist theories are inconsistent with the control principle, as agents are no more 
the causes of their actions than they would be if their choices were determined by momentary bouts of 
indeterminism.  Similarly these theories are inconsistent with the non-arbitrary principle because the agent’s actions 
are ultimately nomically necessitated by contingent facts about the world.  And, finally, these theories are 
inconsistent with our intuitions that support Hume’s endurance principle, as people are only blameworthy or 
praiseworthy so long as they are likely to act in a similar manner, which is, ultimately, is a contingent fact about the 
world independent of the action they are said to be praiseworthy or blameworthy for. 
69 My italics, see Robert Kane 2009 
70 See Eccles 1970 and Popper and Eccles 1977. 
71 Kane, 1996b pg. 117 
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According to such theories, most causation is event-causation, while substance-causation 
– specifically agent-causation – is appealed to only to explain libertarian agency.  Such theories 
are inelegant, given that pure event-causal theories offer nearly the same explanatory value – at 
the “low cost” of rejecting our moral commitments to principles like the control principle or the 
principle of alternate possibilities.  Is the substantial reduction in ontological commitment worth 
rejecting these commonsense, deeply held moral principles?  I believe that it is not.72  However, 
there is an alternative to these kinds of mixed-causation worldviews, one that doesn’t posit the 
existence of event-causation. 
All things being equal, there is nothing inherently more ontologically troubling about 
substance-causation than event-causation.  The key difference is that the latter places the causal 
force behind temporally fleeting events, while the former places it behind persisting substances 
that change over time.  In virtue of this, consider a world governed wholly by substance-
causation, including agent-causation.  Make no mistake, a world with agent-substance-causation 
is more ontologically complex than a world with only non-agent-substance-causation; however 
the ontological distance between a non-agent-substance causal world and a substance-causal 
world with agent causation is far less than the distance between the purely event-causal world 
and the mixed causal worlds discussed above. 
Pure substance-causal theories are often rejected outright because both our commonsense 
linguistic practices and scientific theories often include talk about events causing other events.  If 
there is no event-causation, critics fear, both our commonsense linguistic practices and scientific 
theories are wrong, and thus adopting pure substance-causation would undermine more of our 
                                                 
72 In chapter 1, I contend that radical interpretation of our beliefs commit us to assuming that our beliefs are (a) 
largely internally consistent, and (b) accurately represent the world.  To reject these moral principles just is to assert 
that our worldview is largely wrong, that we are wrong about most things and that we are wrong about those things 
that concern us the most.  The introduction of such massive error into one’s worldview simply to posit one less 
metaphysical entity is absurd. 
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beliefs than adopting pure event-causation.  But this is a mistake.  The conception of an event 
that event-causal theorists appeal to has no correlation in any modern physical scientific theory.73  
The practical value of our linguistic practices and scientific theories are not undermined by 
adopting a pure substance-causal theory – at least no more so than adopting traditional event-
causal theories. 
Note that substance-causal theorists do not deny that events occur; rather they maintain 
that events are caused by substances.  In reality, the philosophical theories of substance-
causation and event-causation are practically identical.  For example, for the event-causal 
theorist, event e1 causes event e2, where e1 is comprised of substances, s1 changing to s1* over 
time between t1 and t2.  For the substance-causal theorist, e1 causes s1 to change to s1* between t1 
and t2, and s1*, at t2, causes e2.  Both theories postulate the same entities, the only substantive 
difference is where we locate the causal force, e1 or s1*.   
Substance-causation alone is insufficient to capture the moral beliefs embodied in the 
control principle et al., but together with a robust theory of agent-causation, where agent-
substances are complex reason-responsive causes of their own actions, it is maximally consistent 
with these principles.  Agent-substances are the sole, determinate authors of their actions, yet can 
also cite reasons that played a role in their choices.  In light of these unique qualities – qualities 
that are irreducible to non-agent-substance-causation, agent-causal theories do require a more 
robust ontological commitment than alternative theories (although not as great as the multi-
causal “extra factor” theories); however they also explain a great deal more.  A world with agent-
causation is one where people can be actually morally responsible for their actions in the way 
that we believe they are, it is a world where principles like the control principle are actually 
applicable to agents like us. 
                                                 
73 See Carl Hoefer (2008). 
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4.3.1.2 Are Agent-Causes Reason-Responsive? 
One troubling aspect of agent-causation is that it is, in a sense, question-begging.  We’re 
told agent-causes are intelligent, complex, reason-responsive substances but are given no causal 
account of how they operate.  This has lead to continued criticism that agent-causation cannot 
account for our beliefs about an agent’s reason-responsiveness. 
For compatibilists, to be reason-responsive is to have reasons play a role in determining 
one’s actions, whether these reasons be desires, compulsions, beliefs, or the like.  The libertarian, 
too, contends that there is usually some relationship between an agent’s reasons and what they 
do, but it cannot be a causal relationship because then the reason is the cause of the agent’s 
actions, rather than the agent herself. 
In “Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will,” Timothy O’Connor purports to 
offer an account of how an agent can act for reasons without being causally determined by 
them.74  He contends that an agent’s choice can be explained in terms of desires the agent has 
under the following circumstances: 
For an agent a desire D is a reason for choice C if and only if: 
1.  prior to the choice, the agent had an antecedent desire D and believed that action A 
would satisfy that desire, and 
2. the agent’s choice C is a choice to engage in action A, and 
3. the agent’s choice C is caused by the agent in order to satisfy desire D.75 
The aspect of O’Connor’s solution that seems most worthy of noting occurs in 3 above.  
Here, he contends that a desire, what we’re to take as the agent’s reason for acting, is a reason 
the agent acted if and only if the action is done in order to satisfy that desire.  For O’Connor, a 
                                                 
74 O’Connor, 2000b, page 86. 
75 Adapted from O’Conner 2000b, page 86, and Clarke 2008. 
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reason (desire D) is not a cause of an action, but rather the agent is the cause and the agent 
causes it for D, not because of D.  The difference between an agent doing something for D and 
her being caused by D strikes me as an intuitively plausible distinction to make, and a distinction 
that captures the very essence of the control libertarians are interested in.   
One might object that on this view, the reason the agent acts lacks any causal power – 
and thus the question “Why did she do that?” is radically different than the question “Why did it 
do that?”  On one level, I think this is correct – I think that there is a fundamental difference 
between these two sorts of questions.  The latter is concerned with a history of causation.  
However, the latter question doesn’t make sense when applied to indeterministic events or 
substances – for example, you might ask “Why did the electron appear there?” (assuming that the 
place of any given electron in an atom’s electron cloud at any given time is undetermined), to 
which the answer is either (a) for no reason, or (b) because the electron caused itself to be there.  
Qua agent-causal theorist, the latter explanation makes more sense – it was up to the electron, 
much as an agent’s actions are up to the agent.  The difference, of course, is in the kind of 
substance that is doing the causing – that is to say that electrons, for all their wonder, are 
supposed to be less complex than agent-causes.  For the agent-causal theorist, then, one of the 
aspects that distinguishes an agent from a non-agent substance is the agent’s ability to act for 
reasons, as opposed to determined substances who are caused, or undetermined substances that 
are uncaused. 
I think one can further object to this view by questioning the intelligibility of acting for a 
reason.  On this view, acting for a reason isn’t just acting while having a reason (as some event-
causal theorists contend), it is acting with special attention to that reason.  The reason in question 
plays a noncausal role, and yet is supposed to explain the action in question!  At first glance, this 
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may sound bizarre, but it is exactly the sort of role reasons intuitively play in free action.  For an 
agent to act for a reason is for that agent to act with that reason occupying a specific 
epistemological role – one whose role is morally relevant in determining one’s blameworthiness 
or praiseworthiness for the action in question.  There is an epistemological connection between 
the reason and the agent’s choosing to act that is not there in cases of people who act with the 
same reasons, but not on the same reasons.  What matters isn’t what the agent does, but what 
reason or reasons occupy this role while the agent acts.  Whether a reason occupies this role is up 
to the agent, but the role is prima facie mysterious because it doesn’t explain the choice in a 
causal role. 
The question at hand is what is it for a reason to play a noncausal explanatory role.  
Instead of a causal explanatory role, one possibility is that reasons for an agent’s actions play a 
regulative or evaluative role.  Here is such an account:  (i) For a choice, or action, to be done for 
a reason is for that reason to occupy a regulative or evaluative epistemological role when the 
agent acts.  (ii) for a reason to occupy this role is such that the choice or action succeeds or fails 
for the agent in terms of whether or not it satisfies this reason.  For example, imagine the 
following case:  Joey desires to eat a good meal, and chooses to act to satisfy this desire by 
cooking a meal.  Whether or not Joey succeeds in this action is a question of whether or not his 
action satisfies his reasons for acting – in this case, whether Joey get to eat a good meal (in the 
way he thought he would76) because of his action.  When an action goes well, the agent’s action 
succeeds in satisfying her reasons – that is to say that her action played a causal role in satisfying 
                                                 
76 That is to say that Joey’s action is a success if it satisfies his reason to act (because he wants to eat a good meal) if 
and only if it satisfies it in the way he intended it to (he cooks a meal intending for it to turn out good, and plans on 
eating this meal.  If he has this intention, then if his cooking of a meal causes his neighbors to bring over a good 
meal because they know from past experience Joey will fail to cook anything remotely good, and Joey ends up 
eating this meal instead of the meal he has planned, his cooking a meal does not satisfy his reason for acting, even 
though it may result in his desire being satisfied in another way).  
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her reasons.  When an action goes poorly (or fails), the agent fails to satisfy her reasons for 
acting.  In this sense, I think, one can maintain a robust semi-causal role of reasons, without 
reasons playing any causal role in the agent’s action. 
Furthermore, this account of the role reason plays makes it clear that agents can act on 
one set of reasons without acting on all of the reasons they have to act in one way.  For example, 
a hungry person might go to a business dinner to meet people, rather than to satisfy her hunger. 
If reasons play this role, the question is how does an agent decide what reasons occupy 
this special epistemological role?  Intuitively this, much like whether they act or not, is up to an 
agent.  The question at hand, then, is whether or not the agent has control over both her reason-
selection and her actions that is necessary for moral responsibility.  And this question leads us to 
reconsider the Mind argument. 
4.3.1.3 The Mind Argument Revisited 
Let’s reconsider Peter Van Inwagen’s interpretation of the Mind argument – he contends 
that what doesn’t follow deterministically from one’s previous states is a result of an 
indeterministic process, and that no one can determine the outcome of an indeterministic process 
(2008, 16).  If agent-causation is possible, this is false.  For the substance-causal theorist, for 
something to be the result of an indeterministic process just is for that something to be caused by 
a substance such that the outcome is not wholly determined by antecedent facts about the world 
(coupled with the laws of nature).  For an agent-cause to cause something in this way just is for it 
to be up to the agent.  Thus, if agent-causation is possible, it is always the case that the agent-
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substance determines the outcome of the agent’s undetermined (by antecedent circumstances) 
event.77,78 
Despite the fact that agent-causation would be sufficient to show that an action is up to 
the agent in question, it’s not prima facie clear how this grants the agent the sort of control 
necessary for moral responsibility.  If the agent’s action is not causally determined by antecedent 
circumstances, then some argue that it is a matter of chance.  And surely no one can be in control 
(in the way required for moral responsibility) of what is merely chance or luck. 
There are, I think, two possible accounts of what this “chance” is.  The first account of 
chance, and the one seemingly advocated by the compatibilist, is that something is a matter of 
chance if it is not causally determined.  However, appeal to this account by critics of 
incompatibilist theories would be begging the question; it would be an argument by definition, 
and it is an open question whether or not that definition of “chance” accurately reflects the robust 
intuitive concept we come to the table with.   
A less-question-begging account is that something is a matter of chance if there is no 
explanation for it’s being the case.  Critics of agent-causation would be quick to point out that 
there is nothing in the past that makes it the case that the agent chooses to act as she does, and 
thus it must be luck that she ends up doing what she does, and luck that so often such agents 
                                                 
77 Donald Smith and E.J. Coffman (forthcoming) present a similar argument.  They contend that the Mind argument 
stands or falls on the assumption that an event has only other events among its causes.  If this is false, as it would be 
if agent-causation is true, then the Mind argument is false. 
78 There is, I think, an uncharitable account of the mind argument that is sometimes proposed, which basically says 
that no event can be both determined and undetermined, and that indeterministic theories of free will require free 
events to be both determined and undetermined, and thus no indeterministic account of free will is possible.  Ginet 
(1989, 20) addresses, and refutes this objection.  The libertarian doesn’t require that an action is both caused by the 
agent and uncaused by anything; rather the libertarian contends that the agent’s action must be caused by the agent, 
and the agent must not have been caused by antecedent events to act in the way she did.  (She can, of course, be 
prompted (or not) to act, and she can, of course, have her options limited by antecedent circumstances – but what 
matters is that she, and not the antecedent circumstances, determines what she will do).  
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would end up acting in accordance with some reasons the necessitartian would point to as causes 
for a determined agent to act. 
The agent causal theorist should be quick to point out that there is an explanation for it 
being the case that an agent acts as she does – because the agent herself willed, or chose, to do 
so.  Furthermore, O’Connor’s account of acting for reasons demonstrates why there can be a 
constant conjunction of reasons with actions without one causing the other. 
A second account in which something can be a matter of chance is that it is outside of 
anyone’s control.  The result of the coin flip, or the dice roll, or the deal of the cards is a matter 
of chance because (assuming no card-counting, or it’s dice and coin equivalents) although it may 
be completely nomically necessitated, the outcome is determined by brute facts about the world, 
and not by the agent’s actions.  The person flipping the coin may wish for heads, but unless she 
has some atypical ability to control the outcome of the coin flip (say, one garnered through years 
of practice, and mastery of the environment in which she flips the coin), she has no say in its 
outcome – even though she caused it.  This is to say that the coin-flipper may have wanted heads, 
but unless she somehow manipulated the coin in such a way that she knew would cause the 
outcome, an outcome of heads, although aimed at, is merely coincidence.   
However the difference between the result of a coin flip and the agent’s flipping the coin 
is obvious though – although your average agent can’t determine what the outcome is, intuitively 
she can determine that she flips the coin, or pulls the trigger, or raises her arm. 
All too often, I think, critics contend that the libertarian agent’s actions are a matter of 
chance in this way, but this is just to deny agent-causation and postulate something like an 
undetermined event that causes the agent to act in such and such a way.  This latter account of 
chance, I think, is the most intuitive, and least question-begging account, but if agent-causation is 
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possible, then the choices that agent-causes make may not be a matter of chance, rather they 
could be up to the agent who makes the choice.  
4.3.1.4 Is substance-causation incoherent? 
 Perhaps the most interesting objection to agent-causal theories is that it is based on a 
mistake.  We often use language consistent with substance-causation, but critics suggest that this 
language is shorthand for a more robust event-causal account that we, in fact, mean.  Timothy 
O’Connor79 describes this objection as follows:  The critic of agent-causation contends that “We 
often talk loosely as of inanimate objects as causing certain things to happen” (1998, 377).   
For example, we might say something like this: (1a) “The car knocked down the 
telephone pole.”  However, what we mean by this, according to the critic, is that (1b) “The 
movement of the car, coupled with other aspects of the situation (such as the car’s mass, weight, 
etc., the position, mass, weight, etc. of the pole, etc.) caused the pole to be knocked down.”  
Similarly, when we say (2a) “John caused action A,” we mean (2b) “John’s reaction to external 
circumstances was action A.”  For the agent-causal theorist, however, when we say (2a), we 
mean, first, (2b’) “John agent-caused action A.”  One aspect of (2b’) that critics find unsatisfying 
is the question of timing.  Like the car, John persists through time.  However, the car knocks 
down the pole only at a certain time, and if John causes action A, he does so at a certain time.  
Event-causation can explain why the car knocks down the pole at that time – because the car hit 
the pole at that time with a certain speed, mass, weight, the pole had a certain position, mass 
weight, etc… Similarly, event-causation can explain why John does action A at the time he does 
it – because he was caused to by events that he may or may not have played a role in.  If it was 
up to John, and John alone, that he A, and John is an enduring substance, the question is this:  
Why is it John Aed at the time he did, and not earlier or later?  If agent-causation is possible, 
                                                 
79 O’Connor, 1998/2001 
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why does it occur when it occurs, and not at other times?  The answer, I think, is simple – when 
John causes action A, he is reacting to something – the situation that he is presented with.  For 
example, if you ask John why he turned on the TV at 9pm, he might say that he did so to watch 
the news which begins at 9pm.  
Some libertarians, like Ginet, believe it’s important to secure for the agent the ability to 
act spontaneously.  In such cases, event-causal theorists would need to point to some 
spontaneous, indeterministic event, perhaps inside the agent’s mind, that gets the ball rolling, so 
to speak.  For agent-causal theorists, the whole agent would act spontaneously.  All things being 
equal, the agent-causal theorist’s account of spontaneous action is more consistent with not only 
our commonsense linguistic practices (“John jumped out of his seat, without warning or 
provocation, and Aed.”), but it is also more consistent with principles like the control principle 
(that John is morally responsible for his Aing). 
 Regardless on one’s stance on spontaneous actions, for many actions, agents do, in fact, 
react to external circumstances and events.  But there is nothing mysterious about an agent’s 
reacting to a given situation – although, for the agent-causal theorist, it is up to the agent in 
question what to do in many of these causes, their environment offers a finite number of possible 
actions.  Furthermore, external circumstances often give agents reasons to act, and although for 
agent-causal theorists, reasons do not cause the agent to act, actions can be done for those 
reasons nonetheless.  Thus, an agent can’t do action A for reason D unless the agent has reason 
D, and if an agent doesn’t come to have reason D until, say, time t1, then before time t1, it was 
not possible for the agent to do action A for reason D at that time. 
 O’Connor offers a similar account of how agent-causation may work.  He contends that 
although agent-causes may not be able to act ex nihilo, or spontaneously, as Ginet claims they 
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might, they have the ability to govern themselves internally, such that once prompted by external 
circumstances, the outcome is not wholly causally determined by those circumstances, but is 
instead up to the agent (O’Connor, 1998, 378). 
It seems to me that spontaneous agent-causation is no more mysterious in kind than 
prompted agent-causation, as in both cases, what the agent does is said to be up to the agent.  
The difference is that in spontaneous agent-causation, the agent is in control of not only what the 
agent does (given the list of alternatives), but when the agent does it (given the list of 
alternatives).  All that spontaneous agent-causation requires is a list of alternatives that include 
different time-stamps – for example, to spontaneously jump out of one’s seat and stretch simply 
requires that one choose from the alternatives to: jump out of one’s seat and stretch at time t1, 
jump out of one’s seat and stretch at time t2, …, to jump out of one’s seat and stretch at time tn. 
There are other ways in which one might call agent-causation incoherent, 
incomprehensible, and the like.  Most, though, focus on the mysterious nature of agent-causation 
– what is it that makes an agent (or anything, for that matter) an intelligent-cause, a non-
arbitrary-cause, and the like?   Does it even make sense to say that agents are causes in this way?  
These questions, I think, are very important. 
But there are two ways in which these sorts of questions can be asked – the first, is 
whether or not this account of causation and action-explanation is consistent with our beliefs and 
intuitions.  The answer, I think, is obvious to everyone but those who have so engrossed 
themselves in the topic as to render themselves biased – yes!  We talk about non-arbitrary, free, 
undetermined, actions – we talk about agents choosing from amongst alternatives, each of which 
is open to her at the time of her choosing, and we talk about agents being in charge of their own 
future, and their own minds.  Indeed, when these sorts of claims about someone are in doubt, we 
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start to wonder whether they’re actually a moral agent, whether they’re a person, whether they 
have free will, and can be morally responsible for anything. 
The second is whether or not this account of causation and action-explanation is 
consistent with our ontological beliefs, or beliefs about what exist.  This question is traditionally 
answered by asking whether it is consistent with our scientific beliefs and intuitions, which leads 
to the question of the next section… is agent-causation compatible with our best scientific 
theories? 
4.3.1.5 Is agent-causation compatible with our “best scientific theories”? 
 In Derk Pereboom’s “Living Without Free Will,” he contends, “Agent causation is a 
coherent possibility, but it is not credible given our best physical theories” (2002, 477).80  But if 
not agent-causation, what is the alternative?  Event-causation is the most cited alternative, but 
this seems to fare no better.  Carl Hoefer points out that “… neither philosophers' nor laymen's 
                                                 
80 In Living Without Free Will Pereboom, he goes into detail about how agent-causal theories of free will are said to 
be inconsistent with our scientific views (2001, 69-88).  Although Pereboom argues agent causation is coherent, he 
contends that we lack it because it is incompatible with our best physical theories.  While his arguments to this effect 
are too many to cover effectively in this work, it strikes me that Pereboom employs a strategy found in elsewhere 
(for example Flanagan, 2002) that is, I think, turn on an uncharitable account of the causation agent-causal theorists 
advocate.  He asks, “Given our scientific understanding of the world, how could there be agent-caused decisions that 
are freely willed in the sense required for moral responsibility?”  He then claims “if agent-causes are to be capable 
of such free decisions, they would require the power to produce deviations from the physical laws – deviations from 
what these laws would predict and from what we would expect given these laws” (Pereboom, 2001, 79).  By 
“physical laws”, Pereboom means the laws of physics.  The contention is that an agent-cause would require one to 
break the laws of physics – but this, I think, even the agent-causal theorist would find implausible.  What strikes me 
as odd about this argument is that no one (seriously) proposes that agent-causation breaks the laws of physics.  
Rather agent-causal theorists contend that agent-causation can be explained in terms of the laws of physics.  It is the 
case that our current best scientific theories fail to explain the unique account of causation required for moral 
responsibility by the agent-causal theorist, but they fail to offer a robust, intuitive account of anything like an event 
either.  But surely this omission from the current state of the art physical laws doesn’t mean that we ought to give up 
all philosophically relevant accounts of an event.  It may very well be the case that our best physical theories are 
prima facie inconsistent with agent-causation, I think detractors like Pereboom unduely help themselves to intuitive 
plausibility when they contend that the agent-causal theorist advocates a type of causation that violates the physical 
laws.  This is false.  Rather, what they advocate is a type of causation that is prima facie inconsistent with our 
current best physical laws, but also contend that our best physical laws are, at best, incomplete; at worst, full of 
holes and mistakes.  Pereboom paints a picture of the agent-causal theorist trying to force a puzzle piece into a near-
completed puzzle, while in reality it’s more like the agent-causal theorist is trying to do her best to fit a puzzle piece 
into a puzzle that is missing half of it’s pieces – a puzzle piece that came with the box, and looks as if it belongs to 
the puzzle.  We should balk at the agent-causal theorist if she contends that our physical laws are routinely broken 
by agent-causes, but her position is far less preposterous if she contends that the proper account of our physical laws 
will explain agent-causation, much as they explain non-agent-causation. 
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conceptions of events have any correlate in any modern physical theory….” (2008).  In an aside, 
he explains what may have lead so many philosophers astray, “Some philosophers are misled on 
this point by the fact that some now-defunct presentations of Special Relativity theory seem to be 
grounded on an ontology of events. But Special Relativity does not need to be so presented, nor 
were the “events” used anything like common sense events.”  Perhaps we ought to go back to 
Hume’s account of causation, as a constant conjunction of cause and effect81 – but this account 
seems perfectly consistent with either event-causation or substance-causation, and – worse stlll – 
gives us no account of the science underlying causation.   
 Adding to the confusion, many event-causal thoerists claim agent-causation is reducible 
to event-causation, in manners similar to those O’Connor cited (discussed above).  However, I 
see no reason the substance-causal theorist couldn’t offer similar claims about the reduction of 
events to substances, including in some cases agent-substances.  The only difference, it seems, 
between the two projects is that agent-causation is able to capture this concept of an action’s 
arising from the agent, qua enduring substance, while event-causation is stuck positing either a 
fickle, disappearing instance of indeterminacy or a lifetime of determinism.  Indeed, agent-
causation affords us all of the causal control as deterministic theories of free will (insofar as the 
agent is the cause of her actions), while securing the ability to do otherwise (required by AP) in 
the agent herself, rather than in some indeterministic event. 
 After advancing an agent-causal view, in “Human Freedom and the Self,” Roderick 
Chisolm says the following: 
If we are responsible, and if what I have been trying to say is true, then we have a 
prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime 
                                                 
81 David Hume A Treatise on Human Nature 2.3.2.4. 
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mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing — 
or no one — causes us to cause those events to happen (Chisholm, 1964/2002, 55–56). 
When acting as an agent-cause, Chisholm contends, we have an ability found nowhere else in 
nature.  He follows up this by claiming: 
This means that, in one very strict sense of the terms, there can be no science of man. If 
we think of science as a matter of finding out what laws happen to hold, and if the 
statement of a law tells us what kinds of events are caused by what other kinds of events, 
then there will be human actions which we cannot explain by subsuming them under any 
laws. We cannot say, ‘It is causally necessary that, given such and such desires and 
beliefs, and being subject to such and such stimuli, the agent will do so and so.’ For at 
times the agent, if he chooses, may rise above his desires and do something else instead 
(Chisholm, 1964/2002, 56).82 
                                                 
82 In the 2002 book The Problem of the Soul Owen Flanagan takes issue with Chisholm’s conclusion, claiming “The 
scientific image says that we are animals that evolved according to the principles of natural selection. Although we 
are extraordinary animals we possess no capacity that permits us to circumvent the laws of cause and effect 
(Flanagan, ix).”  Flanagan, I think, misses the point – for Chisholm’s claim doesn’t amount to the claim that agents 
circumvent cause and effect – rather , it amounts to the claim that there are some causal processes that are not 
determined by antecedent circumstances, and are instead determined by agents.  Such an ability would surely be 
valuable in at least one sense – insofar as agent-causes can choose from multiple options, there is a chance that they 
may choose the right options instead of the wrong option.  Thus, in a situation where another animal is causally 
determined to go left (say, because it looks the most appealing), the agent-cause can cause herself to go left or right.  
If left is a trap, having the ability to go against the best reason and go right is an ability worth having.  Still, 
Flanagan’s point may be that, on average, having this ability is a detriment.  Which animal would more often pass 
the test of natural selection – the animal that always does what it has the best reasons to do, or the animal that only 
sometimes does what it has the best reasons to do (because it has the ability to do otherwise)?  If we assume both 
animals have relatively correct world-views, surely the former.  Thus, Flanagan’s point may be that if evolution is 
true, natural selection would have favored strict causally-deterministic action-causation over libertarian 
indeterministic action-causation.  This objection is equally suited against both agent-causation and event-causation.  
The problem with this sort of objection is threefold – first, it seems to assume that natural selection doesn’t make 
mistakes.  It is prima facie plausible natural selection can select an animal that isn’t the best and brightest, but 
merely the only one left (or the one that sows the most seeds, as it were).  Second, natural selection often selects 
animals for traits that are valuable at a time, but may be less valuable (but, say, not harmful) at other times.  For 
example, consider the gene that causes hemochromatosis, a condition that causes iron to accumulate in a human 
being’s organs, eventually leading to death.  Once thought to be rare, recent research has shown the gene to be 
common.  One explanation for the frequency of the gene is that it cuts off the iron available to iron-feeding bacteria 
like the bubonic plague.  Hemochromatosis is, at best, contingently valuable, but without the prevalence of such 
diseases, having the gene for hemochromatosis is, all things being equal, detrimental.  Third, it is not at all clear that 
having the God-like ability to be one’s own cause is at all less valuable from an evolutionary standpoint than the 
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If Chisholm is right, then of course agent-causation is inconsistent with our best scientific 
theories, as our scientific theories are concerned with regular laws, and mankind transcends this 
ability.  Despite this, it is a mistake to say that the workings of free agents is outside the realm of 
science – it seems to me that the end of science isn’t just a matter of explaining natural laws, 
rather it has a more lofty goal: to explain everything – even those things that cannot be explained 
in terms of causal laws.  In light of this, were the agent-causal views really inconsistent with the 
our best scientific theories, it would count as evidence against the the theory that agent-causation 
may be true at the actual world.  However, philosophers who offer a detailed metaphysics of 
causation tend to subscribe to either agent-causation or event-causation, and neither one seems to 
obviously more consistent with our best scientific theories than the other.  In light of this, the 
question becomes which theory of causation better explains our moral beliefs and intutions, as 
they are on roughly equivalent scientific footing.  If the answer to this question is agent-
causation, as I’ve argued it is, then we have every reason to believe that agent-causation is 
possible, even likely, at the actual world.83  Since we have good reason to think agent-causation 
is possible at the actual world, we have good reason to think that libertarian moral responsibility 
is possible at the actual world. 
                                                                                                                                                             
alternative.  The ability to pick from multiple alternatives is prima facie more valuable than being caused to act in 
one way alone.   For every horror story of some agent, acting freely, doing something dangerous and stupid, there is 
an innovation story of some agent, acting freely, doing something others had never thought of before, doing things 
in a new way.   Surely, in this sense, the ability to be one’s own cause offers great risk and great reward.  To the 
extent that agent-causes not only control their actions, but are non-arbitrary, intelligent causes, the evolutionary 
benefit of the latter surely outweighs the evolutionary drawback of the former. 
83 Especially in virtue of the approach I advocate in chapter 1. 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
5.1 This has been a defense of libertarianism 
According to libertarianism, to be morally responsible for something requires that you 
own that thing; if moral agents are morally responsible for anything, they are so for their own 
actions because they are the free causes of those actions.  Libertarianism is maximally consistent 
with our commonsense beliefs about moral responsibility; the vast majority of our deeply held 
moral principles only make sense on the assumption that what the moral agent does is up to her, 
that she is the free cause of her actions.  Only then does it make sense to blame or praise her, 
rather than some external cause, such as genetics, contingent events, or even some indeterminism 
at the subatomic level.   
Libertarianism is maximally consistent with the control principle and the principle of 
alternate possibilities, and in virtue of chapters 2 and 3, I believe we have good reason to think 
that these principles adequately capture the core of our commonsense moral beliefs and 
intuitions.  In recent years, these principles have been challenged.  The problem of moral luck 
threatened to undermine our confidence in the control principle, much as Frankfurt’s famous 
case threatened to undermine the near-universal agreement about the truth of principle of 
alternate possibilities.  In chapter 2 I argued that libertarianism is immune to resultant luck, 
situational luck, and circumstantial luck, and in chapter 4 I show that libertarianism, despite 
requiring indeterminism, is immune to causal luck because it requires agent-causation, or 
something very much like it.  In chapter 3 I argued that Frankfurt’s argument against the 
principle of alternate possibilities failed because his supposed counterexample fails to 
demonstrate the falsity of any charitable interpretation of the principle.  At best, Frankfurt has 
shown that moral agents do not require alternate outcomes to be morally responsible, but to hold 
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agents morally responsible for the results of their actions, rather than their free choices that 
caused their actions, would be to introduce resultant luck into the picture. 
Libertarianism requires indeterminism, and in chapter 4 I argued that indeterministic 
theories of moral responsibility only make sense if they appeal to agent-causation, or something 
very much like it.  I’ve shown how agent-causal indeterministic theories can answer three 
criticisms that event-causal indeterministic theories cannot.  At best these arguments show that 
moral agents lack control, or authorship, over their actions if event theories of causation are true.  
If events cause other events, and moral agents aren’t events, but substances, then moral agents 
can never be the author of their own actions in the way libertarianism requires for moral 
responsibility.  However, if substance-causation, in particular agent-causation, is possible, then 
substances, such as agents, can cause events.  These agent-causes can thus be morally 
responsible for the events they have complete control over, their own choices and intentions.  
Following this, I defended the theory of substance causation from five traditional criticisms.  I 
argued that substance-causation is no more ontologically complex than event-causation, that 
substance-causation is no less prima facie compatible with our best scientific theories, and that 
we have good reason to believe that we may be agent-causes of the kind required by 
libertarianism – because only then can we explain our belief in principles like the control 
principle and principle of alternate possibilities in a way that does not introduce massive error 
into our belief sets. 
5.2 What next for the critic of libertarianism? 
What next, then, for the critic of libertarianism?  In this section, I will discuss three 
directions the critic of the libertarian should explore.  First, it seems to me that record luck, while 
not moral luck, may cause problems for libertarians.  Second, I propose what I believe to the best 
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possible avenue Frankfurt-theorists can pursue in an effort to find a true Frankfurt case, one 
where the agent in question is nontrivially morally responsible despite lacking alternate 
possibilities.  Third, I discuss the situations under which event-causal theorists may have good 
reason to question the legitimacy of substance-causation.  
5.2.1 Record Luck 
Many philosophers who argue that moral luck exists and undermines the control principle 
no doubt find my treatment of moral luck in chapter 2 infuriating.  I argue moral luck exists if 
and only if an entry in one’s moral record is determined, even in part, by luck, or circumstances 
outside of their control.  The number of entries in one’s moral record, and whether or not one is a 
moral agent (rather than a non-agent such as a chair) are not instances of moral luck; rather they 
are instances of what I call record luck.  Record luck exists.  However, it is my position that no 
one is properly any more or less morally praiseworthy or blameworthy in virtue of record luck. 
There are two types of record luck – (1) luck in one’s having a moral record, and (2) luck in the 
number of entries in one’s moral record.  It seems to me that the critic of the control principle (or 
libertarianism in general) might argue that record luck of either of these types would undermine 
our moral intuitions and thus collapse the web of beliefs that lead many of us to believe 
libertarianism is true. 
In regards to (1), suppose a morally blameworthy agent were to contend that it was her 
bad fortune to be a person, rather than a chair, because as a non-person she would be neither 
praiseworthy or blameworthy, and surely this is morally preferable to her current state of being 
morally blameworthy.  I suppose the argument would go something like this: 
1. It is only luck that I am a person, and not a non-person. 
2. Only persons can be morally blameworthy 
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3. Thus, it is a matter of luck that I am morally blameworthy. 
This argument is invalid; the conclusion should be: 
3’. Thus, it is a matter of luck that I can be morally blameworthy. 
While for the libertarian it is a matter of luck whether or not you can be blameworthy, it 
is not a matter of luck whether you are morally blameworthy – that depends upon you.  That just 
is what it is to be a moral agent, a person. 
I take it that record luck of type (2) is typically such a contentious subject because it 
seems inherently unfair that (a) some moral agents get more chances than others, and that (b) 
some get chances to do really great, or horrible, things that others never do.  In chapter 2, I argue 
that the idea of (b) is a mistake – I contend that it is at least prima facie plausible that moral 
agents can choose to do absolutely horrible things on their own.  For example, in chapter 2 I 
suggest that Janine, who opens the door to find girl scouts selling cookies, might form the 
intention to murder someone the next time she believes she can get away with it.  It is prima 
facie plausible that sufficiently developed moral agents can form intentions of this kind in most 
situations where they can act qua moral agents, and that forming such an intention just is 
choosing to act on that intention should the right conditions arise.  In other words, it doesn’t 
make sense to say that some moral agents turn out more or less praiseworthy or blameworthy 
because of the quality of the moral tests they are confronted with, because moral tests are 
concerned with one’s intentions and choices, not the results of the situations they face. 
However, it seems undeniable that some moral agents live longer than others, and have 
more opportunities to act than others. In chapter 2 I discuss a case where Chris and Kris are 
morally identical agents up until a point when Kris dies at time t.  Up until time t, their moral 
records would be identical, however after t, we’re supposed to believe that their moral records 
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would be different solely because Kris died and Chris lived.  The idea is that the final summary 
of Kris’s life is different than the final summary of Chris’s life because the latter lived longer, 
and did more things, than the former.  This seems to me to be a mistake. 
Whether or not Kris and Chris’s moral records necessarily differ because of Kris’s death 
seems to lead us into dangerous territory – either there is an afterlife or there is not.  Only moral 
agents can be morally praiseworthy or morally blameworthy; thus if Kris no longer exists, or is 
no longer a moral agent, after she dies, then it doesn’t make sense to discuss her moral record at 
all.  A summary of her moral worth at her death may be comforting to those who knew her, but it 
doesn’t help us treat her as she deserves to be treated, because she no longer exists. 
Suppose, though, that Kris still exists as a moral agent after her death, as an immortal soul or 
something along these lines.  It seems to me that Kris can continue to make choices that are 
morally equivalent to Chris’s even after death.  If all moral agents are immortal in this sense, 
then it seems to me that – again – one’s total moral worth in life is arbitrarily meaningless – at 
time t2, Chris and Kris may still be morally equivalent despite existing in different forms.  There 
would be no such thing as one’s total moral worth, rather only cursory summaries of one’s moral 
worth at a given time. 
Either moral agents have finite existences or infinite existences.  In either case, this has 
no bearing on what they deserve – whether they are praiseworthy or blameworthy – at any of 
point along the way.  If moral agents have finite existences, there is no point to calculating their 
total moral worth as they no longer exist to blame or praise (their moral record ceases with 
them); if they have infinite existences, there can be no total moral worth, only cursory summaries 
of one’s moral worth until that time. 
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Some people might believe that the passing from life to an afterlife might mark an 
important period where the agent is judged by a more accurate moral judge (whether God, or 
natural forces) than the agent can be judged by during life.  For people who maintain such a 
belief, then record luck may appear to be a problem.  However, the accuracy of a third party 
moral judge at any point in one’s life, and the following (accurate or inaccurate) punishment or 
praise, is neither a matter of moral luck nor record luck.  It is luck in how we are treated. But 
how we are treated, and whether we are treated as we deserve, morally, is ultimately a matter of 
luck.  Some moral luck theorists might contend that this undermines the control principle 
because, ultimately, we lack complete control over how others judge us, such that moral actions 
might not always bring actual praise, and immoral actions might not always bring actual blame.  
However, this is just another case of resultant luck that doesn’t affect one’s actual moral record, 
and thus isn’t a case of moral luck. 
5.2.2 Frankfurt Cases 
I hold Harry Frankfurt’s approach in Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility in 
high regard; to demonstrate the falsity of the principle of alternate possibilities, he attempts to 
construct a situation where an agent lacks alternate possibilities, yet our commonsense moral 
intuitions tell us he is undeniably morally responsible.  The problem is that his example falls well 
short of this goal – he shows that moral responsibility doesn’t require alternate outcomes, but 
fails to show that it doesn’t require alternate possibilities. 
The problem with Frankfurt’s approach, and one that has been repeated in the various 
attempts at constructing such a case that have followed, is that the case is designed to appear to 
the third party observer as if everything was normal, but then the author stipulates some hidden 
aspect of the case designed to cut off alternate possibilities.  The Frankfurt case advocate seems 
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to take advantage of our ignorance about how the mind works, and assumes that given this new 
information about how the mind works, whether atypical nor not, we’d be inclined to make the 
same moral judgment that we would make were we ignorant of these hidden aspects.  But this is 
absurd.  In those Frankfurt cases where the agent clearly lacks alternate possibilities, the 
mechanisms that cut off these alternate possibilities are prima facie agency-undermining, and 
thus good reason to revise our intuitions about the agent’s moral responsibility. 
In a sense, the typical Frankfurt case is deceptive – we’re given a situation where we’d 
typically believe the agent has alternate possibilities and as such is morally responsible for what 
she’s done, and then – surprise – told the agent lacks alternate possibilities, with the implication 
being that we’ve already committed to saying that the agent is morally responsible and should 
stick to these judgments despite the unintuitive aspects of the case.  This approach is 
fundamentally flawed. 
Those who believe Frankfurt was on the right track need to revise how they approach 
constructing a Frankfurt case.  The Frankfurt case supporter ought to attempt to construct a case 
where the agent’s lack of alternate possibilities is obvious even to the third party observer, yet 
where it is equally obvious that the agent is morally responsible for what she has done even 
though she lacks alternate possibilities.  I do not believe such a case exists, however this 
approach is the only approach that can satisfy Frankfurt’s goal of constructing a case where 
everyone, whether libertarian incompatibilist or necessitarian compatibilist, would agree the 
agent is morally responsible despite lacking alternate possibilities.  If the necessitarian is right, 
every case where an agent is morally responsible is necessarily a true Frankfurt case, but 
Frankfurt’s goal was to convince the compatibilist and incompatibilist alike. 
5.2.3 On Agent-causation 
 112
 One option open to the critic of agent-causation, or substance-causation in general, is to 
come up with an alternative theory that doesn’t call into question a large majority of our 
commonsense moral beliefs in the way that event-causal theories do.  Short of this, the critic has 
two options – (1) show that agent-causation, or substance-causation, is incoherent, or (2) show 
that the moral beliefs are consistent with agent-causation are somehow flawed – either (a) they 
are not as widespread as the libertarian claims, or (b) they are the result of a rather obvious, in 
retrospect, series of flaws in our belief-forming processes.  Regarding (1), the concept of 
substance-causation is prima facie neither more ontologically complex or incoherent than it’s 
alternatives, most notably event-causation.  Agent-causation is often attacked on the basis that it 
is an uncaused, but purposeful kind of causation, but this just confuses the issue.  Agent-
causation is not uncaused, it is caused – by the agent herself – and if event-causation can, in any 
way, be said to be purposeful, agent-causation can surely be said to be purposeful in the same 
manner.  
(2)(b) is a rather interesting approach, although far too often critics of (2)(b) presuppose 
universal causal determinism, and thus beg the question.  Of course if universal causal 
determinism is true, a large portion of our commonsense moral beliefs, as well as commonsense 
beliefs about the world in general, turn out to be false, and by assumption these beliefs would 
have been causally determined by various belief-forming processes that fail to accurately 
represent the world.  The challenge for the (2)(b) advocate is to advance a theory to explain these 
beliefs that does not presuppose the very theory that it is attempting to make more palatable. 
Perhaps the best way to approach (2)(a) is to engage in experimental philosophy, along 
the lines of what Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe have done recently.84  Nichols and Knobe 
                                                 
84 See Nichols, Shaun and Knobe, Joshua, 2007, “Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of 
Folk Intuitions,” Nous 41, 663-685.  
 113
conducted a series of experiments that seem to show that people have both compatibilist and 
incompatibilist intuitions about moral responsibility.  Subjects were presented with one of two 
near- identical cases where the case’s antagonist causes harm to others, but has no control over 
their action.  In one variation, the harm is described in detail, in the other the harm is described 
dispassionately.  Nichols and Knobe contend that the responses consistent with compatibilism 
may have been a byproduct of affective-performance error; the cases which tended to produce 
compatibilist-style responses from subjects tended to have language which would agitate the 
subject’s emotions.  Nichols and Knobe contend that this increased emotional agitation may lead 
to errors in judgements of moral responsibility.   
Perhaps the largest problem with experimental philosophy is that the very distinctions 
that philosophers are interested in are often hard to capture through the experimental process.  
When subjects are presented with one case there is nothing to compare it to, when they are 
presented with multiple cases there is too much temptation to distinguish between the two.  The 
very act of presenting laymen with the robust, philosophically distinct cases necessary to gauge 
whether they make certain distinctions might cause the agents to make the distinctions they 
wouldn’t normally make.  Still, to the extent that agent-causal libertarianism appeals to it’s 
consistency with commonsense moral beliefs, any attempt to gauge whether or not these beliefs 
are actually commonsense is prima facie relevant. 
5.3 What next? 
According to the libertarian, moral agents are morally responsible for their free choices 
and intentions, not the results of their actions.  The libertarian, it seems, has two distinct projects 
to pursue – first, insofar as our justice system is concerned with treating people as they ought to 
be treated, the government has a purely practical interest in developing a technology that would 
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allow us to access the otherwise private minds of others, specifically those whom we have good 
reason to believe acted immorally, such as in virtue of the results of their actions.  If technology 
progresses at anywhere near the rate it has during my lifetime, I think we have good reason to 
believe this technology is not only possible, but likely within several decades.  Such technology 
will no doubt raise many important moral questions, and should not be used in the everyday lives 
of people.  However, to the extent that justice systems are concerned with discovering the truth 
of how people ought to be treated, such a tool would allow legal systems to better conform with 
our commonsense moral beliefs and, ultimately, allow us to treat people how they deserve to be 
treated more often. 
Second, because what determines one’s moral responsibility is one’s inherently private 
mental states, including the epistemological connections between one’s reasons and their choices 
and intentions, moral philosophers should develop robust theories concerning what counts as 
morally praiseworthy and/or morally blameworthy reasons to act, as well as investigate the moral 
character of negligence and willful ignorance, and the role these traits play in determining one’s 
moral praiseworthiness and/or blameworthiness.  Ethics is concerned with answering the 
question “What is the right thing to do?”, and often times the right thing to do is to treat people 
how they deserve to be treated – to praise the praiseworthy, and blame the blameworthy.  This 
includes blaming the person who did the right thing for the wrong reasons, and praising the 
person whose good intentions had bad unintended consequences.  Some people say that the road 
to hell is paved with good intentions, but surely this road is at least more a circuitous route to hell 
than the road paved with bad intentions. 
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